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Active vs passive management is a central debate within asset management, with active 
managers promising superior market beating performance after fees through their superior 
knowledge and stock selection. This study investigates the performance of 34 South African 
property unit trusts over multiple periods between 2005 and 2018. Fund performance was 
evaluated using three risk-adjusted measures, namely the Sharpe ratio, information ratio and 
Jensen’s alpha, in order to determine whether there is significant outperformance amongst the 
funds. The benchmark used to compare performance was the South African Listed Property 
index (SAPY), which is the most common and well established proxy for the South African 
property market. The sample was divided into three periods, long term 2005-2018, medium 
term 2008-2018 and short term 2015-2018.  
In all periods, outperformance of active funds were shown to be inconclusive, with only a small 
number of funds showing significant positive alphas and significantly high Sharpe and 
information ratios. A small number of funds achieved outperformance across multiple periods. 
On average significant outperformance was uncommon and inconsistent. Furthermore, a 
number of funds achieved significant underperformance over multiple periods, with inferior 
risk-adjusted returns and alphas compared to the benchmark. However, the volatility of fund 
returns were shown to be less than the benchmark on average in all periods, indicating that 
active managers were able to reduce volatility compared to the benchmark. In the more recent 
short term period, performance of the active funds were especially low with many negative 
alphas’ present. The best performing fund across multiple periods was shown to be a risk parity 
portfolio of property stocks, which achieved significantly higher returns whilst having lower 
volatility than the benchmark and other funds.  
Ultimately the results suggest that active managers in the sector do not provide sufficient 
evidence for outperformance. Hence investors are better of making use of passive indices or a 
risk parity portfolio if they are looking for exposure to South African listed property. This is in 
line with other international studies which have also found that active management in the 
property industry does not provide significant and consistent outperformance. These results 
provide useful insight to property investors in South Africa and contribute to the debate 
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Active vs passive management has been a longstanding debate within the investing community, 
with contrasting findings as to which strategy earns a higher return and adds value to investors. 
Alpha is the term used to describe the delivery of superior risk-adjusted returns, which active 
managers aim to achieve. Investors often select their fund managers and investments based on 
their potential to deliver significant alpha and fund managers are rewarded on this basis. 
Globally there has been extensive research in multiple asset classes determining whether or not 
asset managers are able to successfully achieve alpha and outperform the market, with no 
general consensus being found. Referring specifically to active management within property 
unit trust market, there have been multiple international studies done, with the consensus being 
that managers in this industry on average fail to add significant value (Kallberg, Liu and 
Trzcinka, 2000; Chiang et al. 2008). Within the South African context, little to no research has 
been done on property unit trusts and whether they are able to provide outperformance to 
investors. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether there is an informational advantage 
present in the listed real estate market and whether or not South African property unit trust 
managers can make use of this to outperform the market. 
1.1 Background 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) has historically had three categories which 
encompass property listings, namely: property loan stocks, property, or property unit trusts. 
Currently there are four types of property entities listed on the JSE, namely property unit trusts 
(PUTs), real estate investment trusts (REITs), property holding and development companies 
and property loan stocks (PLS). A property unit trust or mutual fund is a portfolio of investment 
grade properties that is technically a pooled equity fund that invests in real estate.  Property 
unit trusts invest in listed real estate companies that develop and manage property in various 
sectors such as commercial, retail or residential. The largest REIT’s that make up a substantial 
portion of the South African listed property sector are the likes of Growthpoint, Redefine and 
Hyprop Investments. Investing in property unit trusts provides investors with diversification 
across the real estate market and allows for returns in line with the general listed property 
sector. The presence of property unit trusts and property loan stocks on the JSE has created an 
easy entry and exit into an otherwise difficult market for investors, which usually requires large 
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sums of capital. According to the Association for Savings and Investments South Africa 
(ASISA), securitised property investments offer investors the following benefits: 
● Access to high quality property assets which would ordinarily be unobtainable for the 
average investor 
● Liquidity of investment, compared to investing in direct property which is highly 
illiquid 
● Greater flexibility in responding to market fluctuations and conditions 
● The ability to diversify investments across a number of different asset types 
● Greater cost reduction of fund management through economies of scale 
The advantages listed above are some of the main reasons as to why investors choose to invest 
in property unit trusts, as opposed to investing directly into property or into property stocks 
themselves. The question arises whether the managers of active property unit trusts can 
significantly and consistently outperform the property market or whether investors are in fact 
better off investing in passive indices. Passive funds simply track the property benchmark and 
may achieve greater returns net of fees.  
From the onset of 2019, the property unit trust market in South Africa consists of 45 funds, of 
which 34 funds are actively managed and 11 are passive or index tracking exchange traded 
funds (ETF’s). The total amount of capital in the property unit trust industry is currently at 
R54,621 billion at the end of 2019, which is roughly 10% of the total listed property sector, 
which has R540 billion assets under management (Fundsdata, 2019). The number of property 
unit trusts has increased steadily over the past five years, with 16 new funds being opened since 
2014 (Fundsdata, 2019). The increase in the number of property funds over the last five years 
is likely due to the strong performance leading up to 2017, which saw many firms wanting to 
profit from the bullish run of the property sector.  
The general performance of the South African listed property sector has been poor over the last 
two years, having been the best performing sector in 2017. In 2018, the South African Listed 
Property Index (SAPY) ended the year with -25.2% return (Fundsdata, 2019). The SAPY is 
the oldest and most popular listed property benchmark in South Africa and has often shown to 
be highly concentrated in a small number of large market capitalisation REIT’s. The largest 
five property stocks and REITS make up a significantly high proportion of the index at 63.5% 
at the end of December 2018. This leads to the performance of the SAPY to be highly reliant 
on these stocks and thus makes it highly volatile and less diversified then a less concentrated 
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index. The question arises as to whether active managers in the property industry were able to 
match the strong performance in the industry leading up to 2018. Furthermore, were active 
managers able mitigate some of the losses and volatility that occurred during 2018 with 
superior stock selection and risk management? Lastly, does the highly concentrated benchmark 
mean that active managers can achieve less volatile and better risk-adjusted returns by avoiding 
being over allocated to the largest property stocks? These questions will be discussed and 
analysed in the results of this study. 
Figure 1: South African Listed Property Index vs South African Equities performance 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the performance of the SAPY in comparison to the major South African 
equity benchmark, the JSE Top 40 index. The graph shows the strong positive performance of 
the property sector beginning in 2010 up to 2017, in which South African real estate performed 
similarly to South African equities. However, from the beginning of 2018 one can see the sharp 






Figure 2: Listed Property Vs Residential Property Returns 
 
Figure 2 further illustrates the strong performance of South African listed property up to 2017, 
with it outperforming residential property over all three time periods. This illustrates the 
usefulness of listed property to investors seeking exposure to the property market, as returns 
have been greater than the residential market.  
Since 2010, there has been a notable growth of passive property unit trusts, which may be 
indicative of the market sentiment in the industry. Passive funds may potentially offer superior 
performance with lesser fees than actively managed funds. The same can be said for the general 
equity unit trust industry, with passive funds making up 4.5% of the market in 2010 and 
increasing to 10.8% in 2019 (ASISA, 2019). Determining whether the passive property funds 
are able to outperform the actively managed ones is a key consideration in this research.  
2013 saw the introduction of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT’s) into the South African 
property industry, which are companies that invest directly into income producing property and 
trade like stocks. Since the introduction of REIT’s to the South African market in 2013, the 
listed property sector has seen notable growth, allowing property unit trusts to benefit from 
having a larger selection of stocks to choose from. Property unit trusts seek outperformance by 
investing in specialised real estate securities, such as the South African domestic REITs and 
other property related companies. This would normally be considered as contrary to 
conventional portfolio diversification theory, which seeks to minimise idiosyncratic risk. This 
apparent risk taking activity is however explained by the fund manager’s specialist ability to 
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generate outperformance through his/her superior skills and knowledge in the 
industry (Kallberg, Liu and Trzcinka, 2000). 
The empirical debate whether active portfolio managers can outperform passive managers has 
long been examined in the general unit trust industry. Unit trust managers claim to have 
superior knowledge and skill which allows them to choose outperforming stocks and thus 
promise investors outperformance.  Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) were the first to develop a 
theoretical model which explained how managers could possess superior information from 
asset selection or timing of transactions. However, predominant research into mutual fund 
performance has provided little concrete evidence to show positive abnormal performance of 
managers.  
This paper aims to analyse the performance of active managers, specifically in the property 
unit trust sector. It also refers to the performance of general unit trusts as a whole and whether 
active management provides value through superior performance. Research into unit trust 
performance appears to show inconclusive evidence of value added in the South African equity 
unit trust sector. Currently there is minimal existing literature that investigates the performance 
of South African property unit trusts and whether outperformance is present. 
1.2 Research Problem Statement 
A knowledge gap exists in the current South African real estate industry, as to whether active 
managers in this specific sector are able to use their superior information to pick outperforming 
stocks and provide outperformance to investors.  
1.3 Aims of the Study 
The primary aim of this study is to analyse and investigate the performance of South African 
property unit trusts and determine whether they are able to outperform the market and provide 
value to investors. In doing so one can determine whether the South African property market 
has any informational advantage or inefficiencies which unit trust managers can take advantage 
of. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The objective of this study is to gather total return data on all available property unit trusts and 
the relevant property industry benchmark, in order to determine whether the funds are able to 
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outperform the market. This will be conducted using a sample of funds from the South African 
property unit trust market, covering the period 2005-2018. 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
This paper aims to make an empirical contribution to the body of knowledge of the South 
African unit trust industry. This study will critically evaluate the performance of South African 
property unit trusts and determine which funds are able to provide outperformance to investors. 
Deciding whether active or passive management in the property unit trust industry is highly 
relevant to investors, as they can make a more informed decision. Ultimately, this study aims 
to add to the existing literature in a meaningful way as it provides a performance evaluation on 
an industry that has yet to be analysed in detail. Furthermore, it seeks to provide further insight 
as to whether or not there is an informational advantage specific to the real estate sector which 
managers can take advantage of. 
Studies addressing this issue have been done abroad but not in a South African context, 
analysing property unit trusts specifically.  International studies by Kallberg, Liu and Trzcinka 
(2000) and Chiang et al. (2008) investigating performance in property unit trusts, found 
inconclusive evidence of significant outperformance and persistence of performance. Other 
South African studies such as those by Meyer-Pretorius and Wolmarans (2006) Bertolis and 
Hayes (2014) as well as others, have focused primarily on general equity unit trust performance 
and persistence. There are however, none on property unit trusts per se. 
There are further concerns of market inefficiencies in the South African property industry, as 
the market is recognized for being highly concentrated in a small number of shares. Whether 
active managers in this sector can make use of these inefficiencies is of interest to investors. 
1.6 Outline of the Study 
The remainder of the paper will be structured as follows: Chapter 2 is a review of the existing 
literature relating to unit trusts which will be analysed. Relevant findings and methodologies 
will be discussed which are pertinent to this study. Following this, the research methodology 
and data used in this study will be presented in chapter 3. Next, the data will be analysed and 
the results of the analysis will be presented and discussed in chapter 4. Finally, concluding 
remarks and investment recommendations will be given in chapter 5, followed by 
recommendations for future research. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This section begins by discussing the theory behind active and passive managers and discusses 
the principles behind outperforming the market. Next, there will be a review of international 
literature on general unit trust performance in order to determine whether there is significant 
outperformance outside of South Africa. The methodologies used in these studies will also be 
highlighted. Following this, the results of South African unit trust studies will be discussed to 
determine whether or not there is outperformance in the South African equity market. 
Thereafter there will be a review of the international literature specific to property unit trusts 
and a review of the performance of these types of specialised unit trusts abroad. Lastly, there 
is a summary of the various findings and a conclusion on the consensus given by the literature.  
2.2 Theoretical Reasons for Active vs. Passive Management 
This section will analyse the existing literature and theories surrounding asset performance. 
These theories contrast one another on the effectiveness of active vs passive management. 
2.2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis  
When reviewing active vs passive performance, which is a common theme for unit trust 
performance, a key piece of literature to consider is the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). 
The EMH claims that financial stocks always reflect all the available information and it is 
therefore impossible to “beat the market” on the risk-adjusted basis, since market prices are 
considered to be correct. The implication of the EMH is that when new information arises, it 
spreads quickly and is immediately incorporated into the price of a security with no delay 
(Malkiel, 2003). Many investing techniques such as technical analysis or fundamental analysis, 
make use of either historical prices or financial information such as company earnings, to 
predict the future performance of a share. According to the view of Malkiel (2003), neither 
technical analysis of a stock, nor even fundamental analysis can be used to determine so called 
“undervalued” stocks, which would allow investors to achieve greater returns compared to 
randomly selected portfolio with similar risk. Thus according to the EMH these strategies are 
senseless, as there should be no informational advantage between managers which would lead 
to outperformance. The EMH brings into question the purpose and effectiveness of active 
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management of portfolios, given that managers should in theory not be able to outperform one 
another on an informational advantage perspective. 
The efficient market hypothesis comes in three strengths, namely weak, semi-strong and strong 
form. Each form has separate implications for managers if they are found to be true. The weak 
form claims that investors cannot outperform the market given only historical prices and 
volume data, thus technical analysis is considered futile. The semi-strong form states that 
investors are unable to outperform the market using only publicly traded information such as 
fundamental data and analyst recommendations. The semi-strong form claims that one can only 
outperform the market with insider information which is considered illegal. Lastly, the strong 
form of market efficiency states that investors can never outperform the market, primarily 
because the market prices contain all the available information whether they be public or 
private (Goetzmann, Grinold and Kahn, 1996). 
The general consensus in the literature is that unit trust investment performance is consistent 
with at least the semi-strong form of EMH. This implies that any effort and resources spent on 
research and trading is futile, given that stock prices already include all available information 
(Ippolito, 1993). The EMH argues that active managers should not be able to outperform the 
market on an unleveraged basis and therefore passive management should be preferred. In the 
context of South Africa, studies have been conducted to determine what form of market 
efficiency is prevalent in its market. A study by Smith and Dyakova (2014) showed that the 
South African market is the most efficient market in Africa due to its size and liquidity 
compared to others in Africa. Their results show that the degree of market predictability is 
relative to size liquidity and market quality, of which South Africa was the largest. They 
conclude that with markets being mostly efficient, profit opportunities for active managers exist 
only from time to time. Thus according to the literature there should be a small opportunity for 
active managers to outperform (Smith and Dyakova, 2014). The South African market has been 
shown to be mostly efficient, making persistent outperformance difficult (Smith and Dyakova, 
2014). 
A key idea associated with the EMH is that of a ‘random walk’, which refers to how to price a 
series where all subsequent price changes represent random departures from the previous price. 
It states that price movements from one period to another are independent and approximate to 
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those in a random walk (Malkiel, 2003). The implications of prices representing a random walk 
is, if information is already reflected in the current stock price then prices in the next period 
will reflect the information present in the future period and will be independent of the previous 
prices (Nana, 2011). Ultimately there should be no zero risk opportunities present which would 
allow investors to achieve above average returns without taking on higher risk (Malkiel, 2005). 
News is by definition unpredictable, the resulting changes in price are defined as unpredictable 
and attributed as a random walk. Given the fact that markets are efficient and that prices appear 
to represent a random walk, Malkiel (2005) concludes that markets are largely unpredictable. 
This therefore provides further evidence against the usefulness of active management and once 
again points towards passive management as offering the more rational strategy.  
However, the EMH is not infallible nor devoid of criticism, as evidence has emerged that some 
of the assumptions of the EMH may in fact be erroneous. Evidence emerged that stock returns 
may not in fact be independent over time, as some returns appeared to be positively correlated 
over short periods and negatively correlated over longer periods (Chordia and Swaminathan, 
2000). Furthermore, there has been further evidence of various seasonal and day-of the-week 
price patterns which challenge the validity of the EMH (Berument and Kiymaz, 2001). Lastly, 
there is also evidence which show that stock prices have a considerable degree of predictability 
given their fundamental variables, such as dividend yields, price-earnings ratios, price-to-book 
and market capitalisations (Nana, 2011). These findings show that there appears to be some 
degree of inefficiency in markets which is in contradiction to the EMH. This indicates that 
there may indeed be value in active management and stock selection based on these factors.  
Ultimately if the EMH holds and markets are assumed to be efficient, then it can be assumed 
that active management is futile as managers cannot use superior information to outperform 
the market. In support of the EMH, Malkiel (2003) states that the most convincing evidence of 
market efficiency is the fact that profitable arbitrage opportunities are not yet readily available 
and professional investors are not able to outperform the collective market as a whole. A study 
from Berk (2005) also points out the evidence that active managers as a group do not 
outperform the market. However, a later study done by Berk and van Binsbergen (2017) found 
their sample of active managers were on average skilled and did in fact outperform their 
benchmarks. The evidence for outperformance among active managers is mixed and 
inconclusive, hence the efficiency of markets fluctuates. 
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The implications for this on the property unit trust industry are mixed, as managers in this 
industry may similarly possess or not possess any extraordinary skills that would allow them 
to outperform the market. However if one accepts the EMH, then the theory suggests that on a 
reasonable basis, active managers may not be able to outperform the market and that passive 
management is therefore the most sensible choice. 
2.2.2 Alternative Theory: Grossman and Stiglitz Hypothesis 
The EMH appears to give a reasonable theoretical reason as to why active managers should not 
be able to outperform in an efficient market. There are however some theories which refute 
this claim and propose that there may still be ways in which active managers can outperform 
and add value.  
A paper by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) hypothesised that there was significant value in 
private information that allowed managers to make advantageous decisions. They showed that 
abnormal returns will exist if there are costs in gathering and processing information. These 
abnormal returns are necessary to compensate investors for their work in gathering and 
processing information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). They further postulate that in a large 
and liquid market, information costs would likely only account for a small abnormal return, 
but that the return would still be noticeable. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) conclude by claiming 
that perfectly informationally efficient markets are an impossibility, because if markets are 
perfectly efficient then the return on gathering information will be zero. This would lead to no 
reward, resulting in the futility of the existence of markets.  
Damodaran and Liu (1993), in an American study, added to this concept when they discovered 
that there was material information present in the appraisal process of real estate investments. 
Insiders had access to this information prior to public release, which caused a material impact 
on the pricing of REIT’s. Furthermore, this concept was later supported in a real estate mutual 
fund performance paper by Kallberg, Liu and Trzcinka (2000) who also postulated that there 
was an informational advantage in the property industry. Thus early hypotheses by many in the 
investing community speculate that there are certain informational advantages present which 
can allow some managers to outperform the market. Given the rise in number of actively 
managed unit trusts over the last 40 years this idea seems to be logical, as there is clearly a 
demand for active managers globally. Whether or not this demand is justified in the South 
African property fund sector remains to be seen. Given the hypothesis of Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980), the EMH does not hold and active managers should be able to outperform. 
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2.3 Global Unit Trust Performance Evaluation 
This section will analyse the existing literature on general unit trust performance and 
methodologies used for determining performance. The findings and methodologies used are 
expected to be similar to those in the property unit trust industry. The most common methods 
used to evaluate performance can likely be used in this study. Evaluating the findings and 
results will allow for a better understanding of whether active managers can outperform in the 
case of general equity portfolio management and this can further be linked to the property 
industry. Understanding the performance of international unit trusts and comparing this to 
South African fund performance can also be useful in determining whether the South African 
markets act similarly to larger and more established markets abroad.  
One of the earliest and most predominant attempts to evaluate unit trust manager’s performance 
was done by Jensen (1968).  Making use of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Jensen 
showed a method in which a manager outperformance could be captured by the intercept term, 
alpha, in the model. In his sample of mutual funds from 1958-1967 he found that the average 
value of alpha was in fact negative, implying that managers underperform their benchmark and 
actually destroyed value. This was the first significant study which illustrated that active 
managers underperformed and claimed that passive investment strategies would be of greater 
value to investors. The most common approach in the literature to measure fund 
outperformance, is the use of Jensen’s alpha. It calculates the performance of a fund as its 
return in excess of the expected return of a passively managed portfolio following similar risk 
and investment strategies. The existence of abnormal performance or their stock picking skills 
are assessed by the statistical significance of a t-test (Zhao, Macgregor and Schultz, 2013).  
After Jensen's initial study a large amount of research followed which evaluated the 
performance of unit trusts in more recent periods. A prominent and often cited article by 
Grinblatt and Titman (1989a), identified the presence of skill in some fund managers who were 
able to outperform the market in gross returns. However, when adding fees to the calculation 
the superior performance diminished, thus again showing the fund managers inability to 
actually outperform and add value. The effect of fees dampening returns and making 
outperformance insignificant is a recurring theme in the literature according to Bond and 
Mitchell (2010).  
Ferson and Schadt (1996) made use of the Jensen’s alpha method, as well as two market timing 
models which incorporated conditional information. Their results indicated that equity mutual 
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funds had negative alphas on average, once the returns were adjusted for fees. They included 
conditional performance measures in their study and found that after adjusting for these 
performance increased. However, the performance was still considered below par and 
illustrates that the active managers were unable to add significant value and outperform the 
market. 
Further studies by Malkiel (1995) and Daniel et al. (1997) found that there were small or zero 
abnormal returns in unit trust returns in the US. Furthermore, a study by Sorenson et al. (1998) 
found that only 11% of unit trusts outperformed the US market index S&P500. These results 
were similar to those found later by Malkiel (2003), who found that as many as 71% of funds 
had underperformed the S&P500 net of fees. These results make it evident that a passive 
investment approach would be advisable, given the managers inability to outperform 
significantly. This sentiment was later shown by Fama and French (2010) who showed that 
there were varying levels of skill amongst fund managers with very few of them actually being 
able to outperform the market.  These results appear in line with the EMH as managers are 
unable to outperform which is expected in an efficient market. 
The study by Daniel et al. (1997) investigated whether unit trusts could make use of superior 
stock selection to allow them to earn back a portion of their fees and expenses. What they found 
is that the unit trusts, especially the aggressive growth funds, exhibited some stock selection 
ability but no characteristic timing ability. Furthermore, Massa and Patgiri (2008) claim that 
most fund managers are rewarded for generating alphas, however most managers produce poor 
or negative alphas by taking on liquidity risk through holding illiquid assets to maturity. They 
further found that higher incentive contracts induce the managers into taking additional risk 
and reduce the funds probability of survival. As a result, however, the unit trusts with high 
incentives contracts delivered higher risk-adjusted returns and their superior performance 
remained persistent (Massa and Patgiri, 2008). 
It appears as though in the international general unit trust market the consensus is that a small 
number of managers do outperform, however when taking fees into consideration the excess 
returns become negligible. This ultimately leads to the conclusion that active managers in the 
general equity unit trust industry are unable to provide significant value. Whether the same 
consensus is achieved in the South African unit trust market will be discussed below, followed 
by the results of property unit trust specific studies.  
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2.4 South African General Unit Trust Performance Evaluation 
A number of studies have been done focusing on the South African unit trust industry and 
evaluating their performance. Similar to the international studies, there appears to be 
conflicting evidence in which some studies prove that managers do outperform their 
benchmark on a risk-adjusted basis, while other studies show that they do not.  
In one of the earliest studies done on South African unit trust performance, when the industry 
was still in its infancy, Du Plessis (1974) found that in two unit trusts the absolute trust returns 
had a positive relationship with fund risk, measured by beta. A study by Kerber (1974) 
continued this research into unit trust performance and found that of the 10 available funds, all 
of them underperformed their benchmark on an absolute basis. However, no risk-adjusted 
returns were used as performance measures in these studies, questioning their accuracy. 
Gilbertson (1976) and Taylor (1997) expanded on this research by identifying the limitations 
of the earlier studies and included risk-adjusted performance measures. They found that two 
out of 11 funds outperformed the market on a risk-adjusted basis, however their findings were 
not statistically significant. The general consensus at the time was that South African equity 
unit trust funds had underperformed between 1970 and 1977. 
Gilbertson and Vermaak (1982) were the first to perform a risk-adjusted performance study 
with significant results. They examined the 11 available unit trusts over the period 1974 to 
1981. They found that the fund returns were generally below the returns of the stock market 
indices. However, when risk-adjusted measured are used such as the Sharpe ratio, Treynor ratio 
and Jensen’s alpha, it was found that the funds outperformed overall on a risk-adjusted basis. 
Furthermore, some funds showed significant outperformance on a consistent basis. Gilbertson 
and Vermaak (1982) concluded that their results proved as evidence against the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis and that the JSE was therefore inefficient over the period. In a follow up 
study performed by Knight and Firer (1989), 10 funds were examined over a longer period 
from 1977 to 1986. They also found that five out of the 10 funds were able to significantly 
outperform the market. They too made use of the Sharpe, Treynor and Jensen’s measures in 
order to evaluate performance. This was the first study to show significant evidence of 
outperformance for South African unit trust managers and was in contradiction to the findings 
of Gilbertson and Vermaak (1982) and other earlier studies.  
A more recent study by Oldfield and Page (1997) investigated whether managers of South 
African equity unit trusts were able to earn abnormal returns through asset selection or market 
14 
 
timing decisions. Oldfield and Page (1997) claimed that unit trusts would be attractive 
investments if the fund managers were proven to add significant value through their skills in 
stock selection and market timing. The study looked at a total of 17 funds, eight general equity 
and nine specialist funds, over the period 1987-1994. Their results indicate that the managers 
were not able to add statistically significant value through stock selection or market timing. 
Therefore, according to their results active managers were unable to outperform and add value 
(Oldfield & Page 1997).  
A study by Nana (2012) examined 151 South African equity unit trusts from a period 2001-
2010 to establish whether they exhibit superior performance and persistence in performance. 
The study made use of six performance measures, namely nominal returns, capital asset pricing 
alphas, Sharpe ratios, Fama and French (1993) three factor models, Cahart (1997) four factor 
alphas and Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional alphas to test for outperformance. The results 
were similar to other studies and confirmed that there was no significant evidence of 
outperformance in the equity unit trust industry. Furthermore, there was some evidence of short 
term performance persistence. The study was unable to avoid survivorship bias present in the 
data, however this did not impede on his results as the results still indicated underperformance 
which makes its effects negligible. Nana (2012) ultimately concluded that the study was unable 
to provide conclusive evidence of South African unit trust managers possessing superior skill.  
A further study by Bertolis and Hayes (2014) investigated the performance of South African 
unit trusts against the FTSE/JSE All share index over the period 1994 to 2012. Their results 
showed that unit trusts outperformed in periods of market growth and underperformed in 
periods of economic downturns. They further found that overall there was evidence for slight 
outperformance of unit trusts, but that the outperformance was not persistent and repeatable.  
A newer study by Kenneth, Hsieh and Hodnett (2016), reviewed the performance of South 
African equity trust from 2002-2012. They too made use of risk-adjusted performance 
measures including the Sharpe ratio, M-squared, Treynor measure and Jensen’s alpha. They 
found that regardless of which performance measure was used, the majority of the funds were 
unable to outperform the market consistently. They went on to conclude that the manager’s 
performance was dependant on the market cycle and that majority of the funds showed positive 
performance leading up to the financial crisis in 2008 (boom period) and showed inferior 
performance during turbulent market conditions post crisis (Kenneth, Hsieh and Hodnett, 
2016). This is similar to the conclusions made by Bertolis and Hayes (2014) and re-emphasises 
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that fund managers’ performance appears to be in unison with the performance of the market 
as a whole. Overall the results of this more recent study appear to match the results of earlier 
studies that on overage South African unit trust managers do not outperform the market 
consistently.  
2.5 International Property Unit Trust Performance Evaluation 
This section will analyse the literature surrounding studies done specifically on the property 
unit trust industry and the findings and methodologies used in these studies. One may expect 
the results of property unit trust performance to be comparable to equity unit trusts given the 
implications of the EMH. However, some research has pointed to potential reasons as to why 
property unit trusts could have a performance advantage. The predominant studies on property 
unit trusts will be discussed below to form a consensus on whether active managers in the 
property sector provide significant outperformance above and beyond the performance of 
general equity unit trusts.  
Property unit trusts and mutual funds are funds that specialise in real estate and property stocks. 
In order to qualify as a property unit trust, the fund needs to invest over 80% of its total 
investment into securities that mainly engage in real estate operations (Zhao, Macgregor and 
Schultz, 2013). Past studies done in the US make use of the passive stock index and the real 
estate index as the benchmark in order to measure the funds’ performance (Kallberg, Liu and 
Trzcinka, 2000; O’Neil and Page 2000, Yin and Yung, 2004). The use of a real estate 
benchmark can be considered to be a comparable passive alternative to an active fund, due to 
the excess risk exposure of the funds to the performance of the real estate market as a whole. 
Thus the use of a property benchmark is preferable to a general equity benchmark. 
Original research by Damodaran and Liu (1993) and Kallberg, Liu and Trzcinka (2000) suggest 
that investment managers in the property industry can produce positive abnormal returns 
because of their specific valuation skills and superior information regarding real estate 
investment targets. Damodaran and Liu (1993) discovered that there was material information 
present in the appraisal process, which insiders had access to prior to public release, which 
causes a material impact on the pricing of REIT’s. This is a main proponent as to why property 
unit trusts may show outperformance of the market and provide value to investors. This idea 
was backed up by research done by Kallberg, Liu and Trzcinka (2000), as their study showed 
that their sample of REIT unit trusts had a net positive alpha after fees. They similarly 
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discovered that the existence of persistently valuable private information in the real estate 
market. This conceivably more than in the equity market, given the well documented 
difficulties in determining accurate estimates in the risk and return in real estate assets. Whether 
or not this informational advantage applies to a smaller and less liquid market such as the South 
African real estate market remains to be tested.  
The findings of Kallberg, Liu and Trzcinka (2000) allude to strong evidence to suggest that 
past performance of a real estate fund effected its future performance. This evidence was 
initially found by Shukla and Trzcinka (1994) who found that the persistence in overall mutual 
fund performance was a result of the consistently negative performance of inferior finds and 
the constant positive performance of superior funds. Thus the literature has shown that 
performance persistence exists in the real estate mutual fund market in the short term. Whether 
the same phenomenon occurs in the South African market is yet to be determined.  
Additional research by Edward and Daniel (2000) looked at property fund returns over a short 
term three-year period from 1996 to 1998 and found that on average, the funds did not deliver 
positive abnormal returns. They further went on to conclude that the funds’ performance was 
correlated with expense ratios, turnover and fund age, with larger funds outperforming smaller 
ones (Edward and Daniel, 2000). 
A later study by Lin and Yung (2004) analysed the performance of real estate mutual funds 
from 1993-2001 and found contrasting evidence to original studies of by Damodaran and Liu 
(1993) and Kallberg, Liu and Trzcinka (2000). They made use of a Fama and French three 
factor model and the Cahart four factor model to measure abnormal performance. The rationale 
behind using the factor models instead of simply the Jensen’s alpha method is that the factor 
models are more comprehensive and capable of revealing influencing factors on the real estate 
market. Their results showed that the US mutual funds did not outperform both the stock 
market benchmark and the real estate index. They found that the mutual fund performance was 
mainly determined by the performance of the real estate sector as a whole. These results are in 
line with some of the earlier general equity fund performance papers by Bertolis and Hayes 
(2014) and Kenneth, Hsieh and Hodnett (2016). If the benchmark used was the real estate 
index, the influence of the benchmark on the funds overshadowed all other factors in the model. 
They further found that risk-adjusted fund returns were related to fund size, however expense 




This sentiment was followed by a study from Chiang et al. (2008). They found that performance 
of the funds was sensitive to model selection and specification. Overall they found that the fund 
managers in the US were unable to produce abnormal returns and outperform their benchmarks. 
This is in contrast to other studies such as Damodaran and Liu (1993) and Kallberg, Liu and 
Trzcinka (2000). Chiang et al. (2008) went on to conclude that although the property funds 
were unable to outperform their benchmarks, they were able to create higher returns than other 
mutual fund categories over the period. Thus there appears to be some form of advantage to 
investing in real estate funds as they were still able to outperform competing funds, despite not 
being able to outperform their benchmarks. This highlights the potential usefulness of investing 
in a passive fund that is able to accurately and cost effectively track the real estate market.  
In terms of persistence of property funds’ performance, a paper by Derwall et al. (2009) 
confirm the existence of a momentum effect in US REIT mutual funds. Derwall et al. (2009) 
found that funds with relatively high past returns continue to earn high returns on average. 
Their results thus indicated that a momentum strategy, which buys funds with the highest past 
returns and sells short funds with the lowest past return, will produce a return that is 
significantly higher than a common stock momentum strategy (Derwall et al., 2009).  
A further argument made as to why property unit trusts may be able to provide further 
outperformance, is due to their ability to provide additional diversification benefits. Many 
REITS are specialised, as they may own only apartment buildings or healthcare facilities etc. 
Furthermore, these unit trusts can provide greater liquidity than REITS as they often have more 
access to capital than REITS do alone (Ntuli and Akinsomi, 2017). However, a reason for 
underperformance is the fact that many of the companies and REITS that the unit trusts invest 
in are also property funds, which means that investors have to pay two management fees before 
they see returns. Other research on funds of funds has indicated that real estate fund managers 
can outperform by investing in illiquid REITs with small market capitalizations to create 
superior returns. (Chiang et al., 2008). 
A study outside of the US by Lee (1999) on a sample of 27 UK property funds over the period 
1987 to 1998, also found that managers were unable to statistically outperform the market. The 
study made use of both traditional performance measures such as the Jensen’s alpha as well as 
conditional methods similar to those originally used by Ferson and Schadt (1996). Jensen's 
alpha for the funds were on average negative, which is interpreted as evidence of inferior 
performance. However, when the conditional methods are used for measuring performance, 
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fund performance improves to neutral risk-adjusted performance, instead of underperformance. 
The relatively poor results found in previous studies using traditional measures can hence be 
attributed to the time variation in conditional betas as well as the expected return of the market 
(Lee, 1999). 
Further studies from outside the US looked at performance of 17 Italian real estate mutual funds 
from 2005-2008 (Morri and Lee, 2009). They compared performance of funds using the Sharpe 
ratio and found that the average Sharpe ratio was 0.13 across the funds, with five funds 
managing to outperform. The results were however insignificant and therefore did not indicate 
that there was substantial outperformance in the Italian property unit trust market over the 
period (Morrie and Lee, 2009) 
Most of the original literature reviewing property fund performance use only the net returns of 
funds and do not consider the interaction between fund costs and performance (Kallberg et al., 
2000; Lin and Yung, 2004; Chiang et al., 2008). Hartzell, Mühlhofer and Titman (2010) were 
the first to examine a funds returns before and after fees to determine whether they were able 
to outperform before fees were taken into account. Their study made use of three types of REIT 
based benchmarks, which include three factors, namely a property type factor, characteristic 
factor and a statistical factor. They found the fund performance was dependant on the choice 
of benchmark. This highlights the importance of selecting an appropriate benchmark in order 
to obtain the most accurate results and ensure that any performance differences are in fact 
accurate. The effects of benchmark selection on performance evaluation will be discussed in 
more detail below.  
Ultimately it appears as though the results of numerous property unit trust studies indicate that 
outperformance of managers is inconclusive, with replicable results being difficult to achieve. 
This is in line with the EMH discussed earlier, as in an efficient market all public and relevant 
information should be known by all members and informational advantages between managers 
should not exist. However, a number of key studies have indicated to some managers being 
able to provide significant outperformance and that performance of funds in some markets does 
persist. Higher performing funds have been shown to perform better than the lower ranked 
funds and this can provide some value to investors seeking the best fund performance. 
Ultimately the consensus for the property unit trust market appears to be similar to the general 
equity unit trust market, with mixed and inconclusive results. 
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2.6 South African Property Unit Trust Literature 
Studies done on South African property unit trusts have been rare, with the most recent one 
being done by Potelwa (2013). Their study looked at the performance of all listed property in 
South Africa, including property loan stocks, property holding and development companies, 
real estate investment trusts as well as property unit trusts. The aim of their research was to 
determine whether any of the categories provided superior performance over the others. The 
results indicated that there was no significant difference between the performances of the 
various categories. Furthermore, the findings from the study showed that all of the property 
categories in fact had negative alpha values, indicating that they underperformed the market on 
a risk-adjusted basis (Potelwa 2013). This finding is in line with many of the international 
papers and again shows that these types of actively managed funds were unable to outperform 
the market significantly. This study however made use of a custom spliced index and did not 
use the SAPY directly as the benchmark. The results from this study need to be taken with 
some caution, as there were only five unit trusts used in the study, thus these results are in no 
way conclusive or robust. This highlights the need for further in-depth research on this topic, 
to adequately determine whether South African property fund managers are able to add value 
to investors and outperform the market. 
2.7 Benchmark Selection and Concentration 
A key factor when performing fund performance evaluation is the consideration of what proxy 
to use as a benchmark for market performance. A number of unit trust performance papers have 
alluded to the importance of appropriate benchmark selection and how that can influence the 
outcome of one’s results. The characteristics of an appropriate benchmark were initially set out 
by Bailey (1992). Benchmarks are required to be transparent, unambiguous, easy to replicate 
and measurable.  
Alpha is the term used to measure outperformance of a fund. Calculating alpha requires the 
definition of an appropriate benchmark, which should be a reasonable reflection of the 
investable equity in the specific sector, in order to compare performance (Bertolis and Hayes, 
2014). Studies by Lin and Yung (2004) and Hartzell, Mühlhofer and Titman (2010) suggest 
that the results of a fund’s performance are sensitive to the initial choice of benchmark. They 
go on to define a custom benchmark that is suitable for real estate investments specifically.  
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Lin and Yung (2004) make a contrasting argument that the choice of benchmark is immaterial, 
due to the high correlation between the various real estate indices. Similar results were found 
by Myer and Webb (1993), who used a multi-factor Jensen’s alpha method to evaluate 
performance on 47 real estate funds. They found that the choice of benchmark made little 
difference to performance results, as the fund alphas were not significantly different when 
various real estate benchmarks were used. This is in contrast to what was found by Hartzell, 
Mühlhofer and Titman (2010), Shukla and Trzcinka (1994) and others, who found that the 
choice of benchmark was a significant factor in determining the outperformance of managers. 
2.7.1 Benchmark Choices in South African Property Market 
2.7.1.1 South African Listed Property Index J253 (SAPY)  
The most common and well established benchmark for the South African property sector is the 
South African Listed Property Index (SAPY). The SAPY makes use of capitalisation weights, 
with maximum weightings of 20% per share. A summary of the characteristics of the SAPY 
can be found in table 1 below. 
Table 1: SAPY Characteristics 
 
Source: Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), (2019) 
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One of the main issues with the SAPY is that it has shown to be highly concentrated in a small 
number of large cap stocks in the property sector. Table 2 shows the extent of high 
concentration that is present in the SAPY. The top five holdings make up an average of 60.6% 
of the index from 2013-2018. Furthermore, the top two holdings over the period make up on 
average 35.2% of the index, which further illustrates the high level of concentration present. 
Large real estate investment trusts such as Growthpoint, Redefine and the Resilient group of 
companies make up a significant portion of the index and make it highly concentrated and 
exposed to these shares. These disproportional weights in a small number of the largest shares 
in the REIT and property industry, lead it to being considered excessively risky due to its 
concentration. For comparison sake, the top five holdings in the JSE All Share index make up 
only 41.78% (profiledata.co.za, 2020) at the end of 2018. This again highlights the extent of 
the overconcentration in the property market compared to the general equity market.   
Table 2: SAPY Top 5 Holdings 
 31-Dec-18 31-Dec-15 31-Dec-13 
Growthpoint  21.36% 17.90% 22.71% 
Redefine 16.13% 12.84% 14.73% 
Nepi Rockcastle 12.65% 11.73% NA 
Fortress REIT A 6.73% NA NA 
Hyprop Investments 6.53% 7.78% 9.50% 
Fortress REIT B NA 6.78%  
Lighthouse Capital NA NA 7.46% 
Resilient  NA NA 6.81% 
Total % top 5 holdings 63.40% 57.03% 61.21% 
Total % top 2 holdings  37.49% 30.74% 37.44% 
 
Strongin, Petsch and Sharenow (2000) highlight the issue with many capitalisation weighted 
benchmarks that have large amounts of concentration of share-specific risk in a small number 
of mega-cap shares. Strongin, et al. found that market capitalisation weighted benchmarks are 
not adequately diversified, which contributes as a primary reason for the tracking error of many 
funds, rather than their choice of stock selection. This type of highly concentrated market 
weight index is clearly a concern in the South African listed property sector due to the 
significant concentration that is present. This may be a contributing factor as to why some 
funds underperform their benchmark.  
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An example of the negative impact of the high concentration of the SAPY can be found by 
examining the controversy which occurred in early 2018 surrounding the Resilient stable of 
companies. Resilient came under fire for questionable accounting practices which saw it trying 
to artificially inflate its share price and dividend payments in order to be included in the JSE’s 
Top 40 index. This led to a significant sell off of the Resilient group shares due to fears that 
these companies may be the next in a Steinhoff like collapse.  
The Resilient group consisted of four other listed REIT’s, namely Resilient itself, Fortress, 
Lighthouse Capital and Nepi Rockcastle. These funds combined made up 42.2% of the SAPY 
at the end of 2017 before the incident occurred in early 2018. The group's share price as well 
as the affiliated funds were severely affected by this and dropped by 58.3% on average by the 
end of 2018. This had a significant effect on the SAPY, due the Resilient group of companies 
being such a large constituent of the index. The Resilient scandal made clear the negative 
impact that high concentration in a portfolio can have, as it severely impacted the returns of 
the SAPY. 
Despite the significant shortcoming of the SAPY due to its high concentration, it is still the 
most popular and prevalent choice of benchmark in the property unit trust industry. Given that 
the property funds in this study are local and focus their exposure to local funds, it is still the 
most representative benchmark of the local property industry. Furthermore, almost all funds in 
this study use the SAPY specifically as their benchmark of choice. 
2.7.1.2: Alternative property Benchmarks 
The JSE has recently introduced additional benchmarks focusing on various sectors within the 
listed property sector, which are outlined in table 3 below. These alternative benchmarks were 
introduced to allow for more accurate benchmarking of specific sectors, such as Real Estate 
development and services (J863), SA REIT’s (J805) and overall REIT’s (J867). While many 
of these new benchmarks are useful to compare sector specific performance, they are not all 
useful when comparing property unit trust performance, as they do not represent the market 
that unit trust managers are investing in. 
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Table 3: Alternative Property Benchmarks Summary  
Source: JSE, 2017 
Of the newly introduced benchmarks, the most appropriate benchmark for use in property unit 
trust performance evaluation would be the All Property Index (ALPI). The ALPI was created 
in 2017 and seeks to address some of the concentration issues present in the SAPY. The ALPI 
caps its weightings by 15% and incorporates dual listed property companies, with close to 50% 
of its earnings being derived from outside of South Africa (JSE, 2019). Allowing for dual listed 
companies such as Capital and Counties, INTU and Hammerson, significantly changes the 
exposure to South African only REIT’s and hence reduces the concentration in the index. 
Whilst the ALPI is designed to be used as a benchmark for listed property in South Africa, it’s 
inclusion of foreign property shares make it unsuitable to evaluate South African property unit 
trusts, given that these unit trusts can only invest in South African REIT’s. Furthermore, given 
the recent introduction of the index, it makes comparisons of performance prior to its 
introduction more difficult. Thus despite the shortcomings of the SAPY, it is still the most 
appropriate benchmark to evaluate local property unit trust performance.  
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2.7.2 Benchmark Selection Conclusion 
The effects of benchmark selection on performance evaluation must be emphasised. It is further 
noted that the SAPY has some drawbacks as a use of a market proxy, due to its concentration. 
However, due to it being the longest running and most popular property index used by funds 
explicitly, it remains suitable for this study as a benchmark for performance evaluations. While 
alternative property benchmarks have been introduced, these are not appropriate for property 
unit trusts specifically as they do not represent the market that these funds invest in.  
2.8 Survivorship Bias 
A key factor discussed in the research of fund performance is that of survivorship bias in the 
data. Survivorship bias is defined as the tendency to exclude failed companies or funds from 
performance studies because they no longer exist. This causes the results of many studies, 
which have excluded failed funds, to be skewed higher as a result of only the successful 
companies remaining in the dataset (Pawley, 2006). Thus unit trust performances may in fact 
be misleading due to survivorship bias, as asset management companies may merge funds or 
discontinue underperforming funds, which removes these funds from many analyses. 
Making use of data sources such as Morningstar as done by Kallberg et al., 2000; 2000; O’Neal 
and Page, 2000; Chiang et al., 2008, introduces a built in survivorship bias to the findings. It is 
apparent that many studies done on fund performance fall victim to survivorship bias as data 
is only obtained on funds that are still present during the research period and often excludes 
the data on funds which have been eliminated. Thus survivorship bias causes overestimation 
of performance which needs to be taken into account when analysing results. Making use of 
data samples that include closed down funds is preferable when possible. If survivorship bias 
cannot be avoided, then the estimates of performance must be noted as being overly optimistic 








3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces and explains the data and the research methodology used to investigate 
the research objectives set out in chapter 1. First there will be a discussion around the selection 
of the sample and the property funds included in this study.  
3.2 Data and Data Sources 
The data used for this study has been provided by Profile Data and consists of the monthly total 
return indexes (TRI) of all South African property unit trusts from 2005-2018. Furthermore, 
the monthly TRI index for the JSE SAPY (J253) has been obtained. TRI’s will be used for both 
the funds return and the benchmark return because it is the most appropriate figure, considering 
its inclusion of dividends to returns. Given that property funds have high dividend returns it is 
logical to make use of a variable that is inclusive of all returns to calculate its performance. 
Despite the shortcomings mentioned of the SAPY with regard to concentration discussed 
earlier, it is still the most useful and appropriate index to use as a benchmark, as the majority 
of the funds in this study state directly that this is their preferred benchmark. The 3-month 
Johannesburg interbank average rate (JIBAR) was obtained from the South African Reserve 
Bank website, which will be used as the proxy for the risk-free rate. The use of the 3-month 
JIBAR rate is in line with other South African and international fund performance studies such 
Brink (2003) Botha (2007) and Favre and Apache (2003) who make use of the 3-month JIBAR 
and LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offered Rate) respectively. The risk-free rate will be used to 
calculate excess returns for all the funds as well as the benchmark. Furthermore, the monthly 
TRI’s for the risk parity portfolio of property stocks were obtained from the Salient Quants 
database.  
With many of the unit trusts in question being newer funds which were created recently, the 
time period of analysis will be divided into multiple subcategories to allow for the more recent 
funds with only four years of performance data to be included in the analysis. The periods will 
be broken down as follows:  
 Period 1: 2005-2018 - 10 Funds 
 Period 2: 2008-2018 - 18 Funds 
 Period 3: 2015-2018 - 34 Funds 
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 Out of sample period: 2008-2015 - 18 funds 
Dividing the analysis into these periods will allow for more recent funds which opened after 
2005 to be included in this study. Furthermore, it will accommodate for the different market 
periods before and after the financial crisis of 2008 to be analysed and compared. The financial 
crisis caused a large amount of market volatility, hence it will be useful to analyse performance 
before and after this high volatility event to determine whether active managers were able to 
reduce risks over this period. This allows for a detailed comparison between funds over 
differing lengths of time and aids in analysing whether funds are able to outperform in multiple 
periods. This also allows for the inclusion of an out of sample period from 2008-2015, which 
enables the funds’ performance to be evaluated against a separate period within the sample to 
ascertain whether performance is consistent outside of the specified ranges.  
The newest funds with less than four full years of performance data will be excluded from the 
study. Hence the decision to use 2015 as the start of period 3 is made in order to include the 
largest amount of funds in the analysis by allowing them to have at least 4 full years of returns 
data. This leaves 34 funds to be included in the study, with 29 being active funds and five being 
passive funds. 













Table 4: Property Unit Trust Acronyms 
JSE Code Fund Name 
ABPE Absa Property Equity Fund A 
AFICA Ampersand SCI Flexible Property Income Fund A 
ASMPB1 Ashburton Multi Manager Property Fund B1 
CPEF Coronation Property Equity Fund A 
CSAPF Citadel SA Property H4 Fund B1 
CSPEF Catalyst SA Property Equity Prescient Fund A 
DFPF Discovery Flexible Property Fund A 
DSPFA Optimum BCI Property Fund A 
DWPF Sharenet BCI Property Fund A 
FMFCA Autus Prime Property Fund A 
HPPFC Hollard Prime Property Fund B 
ISPU Alexander Forbes Investments Property Equity Fund A 
MCPFA Mazi Asset Management Prime Property Fund A 
MPIF Marriott Property Income Fund A 
MXPR Plexus Wealth BCI Property Fund A 
NIPCA Nedgroup Investments Property Fund A 
OMRE Old Mutual SA Quoted Property Fund A 
OPEFD Oasis Property Equity Fund D 
PEPI Prudential Enhanced SA Property Tracker Fund A 
PEPTF Prudential Enhanced SA Property Tracker Fund D 
PPFA Investec Property Equity Fund A 
PPFH Investec Property Equity Fund H 
PTXSPY CoreShares PropTrax SAPY ETF  
PTXTEN CoreShares PropTrax Ten ETF  
RBPF Momentum Real Growth Property Fund A 
SAPF SIM Property Fund A 
SAPIF Satrix Property Index Fund A1 
SLPCA Sygnia Listed Property Index Fund A 
SPIFB1 STANLIB Property Income Fund B1 
SSPF1 Sesfikile BCI Property Fund A1 
STPI STANLIB Property Income Fund A 
STPROP STANLIB SA Property ETF  
TNICA True North IP Enhanced Property Fund A 
VAPF Select BCI Property Fund A 
3.3 Research Design 
This section will discuss the methods used to calculate and evaluate a fund’s performance.  
3.3.1 Nominal Return Measures 
The performance figures of the selected funds are evaluated relative to other funds in the 
sample as well as the market benchmark represented by the SAPY. The nominal return statistics 
of the funds and the benchmark are evaluated by computing their yearly mean returns and 
standard deviations.  
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3.3.2 Jensen’s Alpha  
Similar to many studies discussed in the literature review, the Jensen’s alpha will be used to 
determine which of the property funds are consistent in outperforming the market on a risk-
adjusted basis. Jensen's alpha represents the average return on a portfolio, above or below that 
predicted by the Capital Asset Pricing Model, when using the portfolio’s beta and a benchmark 
as a proxy for the average market return. 
Jensen’s alpha is shown by the following equation:  
RPt – RFt = αP + βP(RMt – RFt) + єPt     (1) 
where: 
 RPt = Unit trust portfolio return for month t. 
 RFt = risk-free rate for month t, given as South African 3 month JIBAR rate. 
 αP = Jensen’s Fund specific alpha which is the intercept term and performance 
measure. 
 βP = measure of systematic risk of a unit trust fund, relative to the market risk premium. 
 RMt = total return of the market portfolio for month t, given as the JSE SAPY total return 
index. 
 єPt = regression error term or residual, with an expected value of zero.  
Theory states that a positive alpha value indicates a portfolio or fund whose returns are greater 
than that implied by the funds specific level of systematic risk, indicating superior performance 
of that fund. Similarly, a negative alpha value indicates inferior performance for that fund. 
Thus a significant positive or negative value for alpha can be interpreted as superior or inferior 
performance which is attributable to the skills of the portfolio manager. The use of the Jensen’s 
alpha to determine unit trust performance in this study is consistent with previous literature 
covered in chapter 2 of this paper. 
3.3.3 Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe ratio is used to determine the ratio between excess average return of a portfolio and 
its risk and is useful to compare the return of an investment relative to its risk. When evaluating 
fund performance, it is not sufficient to take only the returns into consideration, as one needs 
to include a risk measurement that can be included and adjusted for. The Sharpe ratio allows 
investors to rank possible investment options on the basis of their Sharpe ratios (Sharpe, 1966).  
The Sharpe ratio is given by: 
(𝑅𝑃𝑡 – 𝑅𝐹𝑡)
 𝜎𝑃𝑡




 RPt = Unit trust portfolio return  
 RFt = risk-free rate, given as South African 3-month JIBAR rate. 
 σPt = Standard deviation of unit trust portfolio’s excess return  
The Sharpe ratio is calculated by subtracting the risk-free rate from the return of the portfolio 
and dividing that result by the standard deviation of the portfolio’s excess return. 
To determine whether a unit trust has delivered superior performance, the Sharpe ratio for each 
fund is calculated and compared to the Sharpe ratio of the market benchmark, in this case the 
JSE SAPY total return index. If a fund has a Sharpe ratio that is larger than the ratio of the 
market, it is said to have delivered superior risk-adjusted performance. A Sharpe ratio lower 
than that of the market, implies the unit trust is said to have delivered inferior risk-adjusted 
performance.  
The Sharpe ratio is useful to rank portfolio’s performance in normal market conditions when 
excess returns to the risk-free rate are positive. However, when excess returns are negative the 
Sharpe ratio becomes biased and may lead to misleading results (Israelsen, 2005). This is 
because a negative Sharpe ratio with a large amount of volatility will in fact make the ratio less 
negative, which implies its performance gets better as volatility increases, which is 
counterintuitive. To offset this phenomenon Israelsen (2005) suggests making use of a 
modified Sharpe ratio as follows: 





        (3) 
where: 
 ER = Excess return of the fund over the risk-free rate 
 𝜎 = Standard deviation of the fund’s excess return 
 Abs = Absolute value  
When negative excess returns are present the term ‘absER’ will also be -1. The modified Sharpe 
ratio will have different values for the Sharpe ratio when negative excess returns are present, 
however the ranking of the funds will be correct. The modified Sharpe ratio will be useful in 
this analysis when the performance of the funds is below the risk-free rate, which leads to 
negative excess returns. Making use of the modified Sharpe ratio leads to an outcome that is 
more realistic estimate of the amount of return per unit of risk taken (Israelsen, 2005). Given 
that the South African property market saw a significant decline at the end of 2018, it will be 
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fitting to make use of the modified Sharpe ratio to compare risk-adjusted performance of funds 
in a negative excess return environment.  
This is one of the risk-adjusted measures that will be used to compare the property unit trusts 
performance relative to one another as well as relative to the market benchmark, to assess 
whether they are able to outperform on a risk-adjusted basis. The Sharpe ratio is useful when  
3.3.4 Information Ratio  
The information ratio (IR) is one of the most commonly used performance evaluation metrics 
as a measure of the mean-variance characteristics of an active portfolio. The IR is defined as 
the ratio of annualised residual return to the residual risk of a portfolio. It is a measurement of 
a portfolios return beyond that of the benchmark, compared to the volatility of those returns. It 
is calculated by dividing the active return by the standard deviation of the active return, known 




     (4) 
where: 
● Rp = Return on the portfolio 
● Rb = Return on the benchmark, the SAPY Index 
● σpt = Standard deviation of the active return (tracking error) 
 
The IR is used to determine a manager’s skill level through their ability to generate excess 
returns to a defined benchmark. A positive IR indicates that the fund manager outperformed 
the benchmark on a risk-adjusted basis, whilst a negative ratio indicates the manager destroyed 
value and underperformed the benchmark. An IR of greater than 0.5 is considered good 
performance, 0.75 is considered very good and a ratio greater than 1 is considered excellent 
performance (Grinold and Kahn, 2000). A positive IR indicates outperformance, however an 
IR below 0.3 is considered insignificant outperformance as it leads to lower t-statistics and 
hence lower statistical significance.  
In order to test the significance of outperformance, a hypothesis test can be used to determine 
whether a funds excess returns are statistically greater than the benchmark. The hypothesis test 




  H0 : Fund excess return less than or equal to zero, or 𝐸𝑅 < 0 
  H1 : Fund excess return is positive , or 𝐸𝑅 > 0 
In order test this hypothesis, a t-statistic can be calculated as the ratio of average excess return, 
divided by the standard error of the average excess return (Goodwin, 1998). The formula for 
the t-statistic is directly linked to the IR, as the IR is part of the formula. The t-statistic can thus 
be calculated as shown below:   
         (5) 
       
    
Thus the significance of a fund’s excess return over the benchmark can be calculated by 
multiplying the fund’s IR by the square-root of the number of observations. This t-statistic has 
a t-distribution with T-1 degrees of freedom, which can be compared to the standard t-tables to 
determine the result of the hypothesis test (Goodwin 1998). If the t-statistic is greater than the 
corresponding value on the t-tables, then one can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that 
the outperformance of the fund is significant.  
In order to ensure that the outperformance is considered significantly robust, a hurdle value can 
be introduced to ensure that slight outperformance does not lead to a larger number of funds 
having significant t-statistics. Due to having a large number of observations, the t-statistic can 
become large, despite the IR being low. Thus in order to ensure that low IR’s of below 0.5 are 
not considered to indicate significant outperformance, a hurdle value of 0.5 for the IR can be 
introduced. This way it is more likely that a significant t-statistic can be said to be due to 







4. Results and Analysis 
This section will discuss the results of data analysis on fund performance and aims to provide 
insight as to whether or not a significant number of funds provide outperformance and add 
value to investors. 
The analysis is divided into three major time periods, the first one covering the entire period 
making use of the available funds from 2005-2018. The second period includes additional 
funds from 2008-2018. The third period looks at all available funds in a more recent 4-year 
period from 2015-2018. Lastly, an out of sample period from 2008-2015 is also included in the 
analysis in order to determine whether or not significant performance was consistent across 
time frames and was not due to abnormalities in the market. The performance of each period 
will be analysed using the three aforementioned performance measures, namely the Sharpe 
ratio, information ratio and Jensen’s alpha. Summaries of each time period will be provided as 
well as an overview of the best and worst performing funds in each period.  
4.1. Overview of SAPY Benchmark Performance 
Figure 3 shows the spread of monthly returns of the benchmark over all three periods. It is 
evident that the returns for all periods are not normally distributed as there is a skew to the left 
in all periods. This is not surprising given that the returns of the market are expected to be 
above 0, given that equity returns are projected to be positive in the long run. The mean monthly 
return is largest over the full 2005-2018 period, with a mean monthly return of 1.2%. A kurtosis 
value of 4.24 indicates that the returns are non-normal and that there is a significant skew 
present.  
The mean return of the benchmark in period 2 is slightly below that of period 1, with the 
skewness not being as severe as in the longer period. The returns in period 3 are the most 
normally distributed, with a mean of 0.0008 and a kurtosis value of 3.8, which is still considered 
high but significantly lower than the other periods. This shorter period has more of an emphasis 
on the large sell off and decline in the South African listed property market which occurred in 


















Mean       0.011821
Median   0.016017
Maximum  0.167133
Minimum -0.149952
Std. Dev.   0.046537
Skewness  -0.387138


























Mean       0.008298
Median   0.011736
Maximum  0.167133
Minimum -0.118685
Std. Dev.   0.044455
Skewness  -0.274556


























Mean       0.000856
Median   0.003944
Maximum  0.090593
Minimum -0.104311
Std. Dev.   0.039806
Skewness  -0.502741
















4.2. Period 1: 2005-2018 
10 funds were included in this period as they were the only available funds which were present 
over the entire period. All funds in this period are actively managed and do not seek to directly 
replicate the benchmark. Any deviations in returns from the benchmark are hence attributed to 
the funds being actively managed and having different weightings and allocations to shares 
than the benchmark.  
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4.2.1 Tracking Error Correlation 
Table 5 below shows the correlation of the tracking error of the funds. There appears to be high 
correlation present across the tracking error of many funds. A correlation coefficient of 0.3 is 
generally considered to be low but significant correlation. This is seen by the cells highlighted 
in green. The significance of the correlation is shown in the table above through a scale of 
colours from green to red. As the correlation coefficient increases the shade of green darkens, 
with the correlations above 0.5 shown in dark green. Correlation of under 0.3 is seen in yellow, 
below 0.05 and negative are seen in orange and red. A small number of funds appear to show 
zero or somewhat negative correlations, such as the STANLIB property income fund A (STPI), 
which had low and sometimes negative correlation with some funds. This is likely explained 
by the STPI having the largest beta of all funds of 0.994 and hence having returns that are most 
similar to the benchmark. Overall it is evident that the funds tracking errors appear to be 
significantly correlated with one another, which is unsurprising given that the returns of the 
funds can be expected to be similar due to the lack of diversification and choice in the listed 
property market. Thus the returns of the funds can be expected to be fairly similar given the 
correlations present amongst their tracking errors.   
Table 5:  Period 1 Benchmark Tracking Error Correlation Matrix: 
 ISPU CSPEF CPEF PPFA MPIF RBPF OPEFD OMRE SAPF STPI 
ISPU 1.00          
CSPEF 0.45 1.00         
CPEF 0.52 0.34 1.00        
PPFA 0.46 0.28 0.36 1.00       
MPIF 0.46 0.36 0.53 0.45 1.00      
RBPF 0.24 0.60 0.29 0.22 0.29 1.00     
OPEFD 0.54 0.38 0.74 0.49 0.71 0.35 1.00    
OMRE 0.39 0.63 0.44 0.42 0.59 0.41 0.58 1.00   
SAPF 0.36 0.65 0.56 0.23 0.48 0.54 0.58 0.45 1.00  
STPI 0.29 0.55 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.42 0.03 0.28 0.41 1.00 
 
Figure 4 further illustrates the correlation between the fund returns that is present by graphing 
the excess benchmark return over the period. From figure 4 it is apparent that the excess returns 
of the funds mostly move together over time, with a small number of funds having larger spikes 
than others. Whilst there appear to be some outliers, such as the Marriot property income fund 
A (MPIF) and the Oasis property equity fund D (OPEFD), the funds in general appear to have 
similar movements in excess returns and hence similar tracking errors. These two outlying 
funds have the lowest beta’s and their returns therefore differ the most from the benchmark. 
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Overall this figure again highlights that one can expect the performance of the funds to be 
similar, with a small number having returns that deviate significantly from the benchmark. The 
largest deviations in returns from the benchmark appear to occur in 2008-2009 and in early 
2018. This is likely due to volatility in the market caused by the 2008 financial crisis and the 
selloff in listed property which occurred in early 2018.  


































4.2.2 Nominal Performance Measures 
Table 2 below summarises the most important performance statistics and comparative figures 
of the funds for period 1. It appears that the funds in this period are on average less volatile 
than the benchmark, as nine out of 10 funds achieved lower standard deviation than the SAPY. 
This can further be seen by the average betas of the funds, of 0.867, indicating that the funds 
on average were less volatile than the market.  The mean return of all funds is however slightly 
below the benchmark, as the funds achieved a mean of 13.7% compared to the benchmark 
mean return of 14.2% over the period. Of the 10 funds six achieved average returns greater 
than the benchmark, indicating that positive nominal returns over the benchmark were indeed 
possible for many funds. However, in order to test the statistical significance of outperformance 
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of returns, it is necessary refer to the risk-adjusted measures with t-statistics such as the 
information ratio and Jensen’s alpha.  
















Alpha  p-value Beta  
Alexander Forbes 
Investments Property 
Equity Fund A 15.38% 15.06% 0.51 0.629 8.127** 0.87% 1.38% 1.21%** 0.000 0.951 
Catalyst SA Property 
Equity Prescient 
Fund A 15.48% 15.51% 0.536 0.437 5.648** 1.19% 2.71% 1.58%* 0.024 0.945 
Coronation Property 
Equity Fund A 14.09% 14.36% 0.507 0.049 0.627 0.17% 3.50% 1.15% 0.111 0.859 
Investec Property 
Equity Fund A 15.21% 15.26% 0.529 0.369 4.769** 1.07% 2.91% 1.57%** 0.031 0.928 
Marriott Property 
Income Fund A 11.12% 10.76% 0.319 -0.452 -5.84** -3.43% 7.58% -0.84% 0.505 0.628 
Momentum Real 
Growth Property 
Fund A 15.36% 13.60% 0.416 -0.209 -2.705** -0.58% 2.79% -0.16% 0.818 0.94 
Oasis Property 
Equity Fund D 11.62% 10.52% 0.284 -0.411 -5.305** -3.67% 8.94% -0.95% 0.581 0.609 
Old Mutual SA 
Quoted Property 
Fund A 15.31% 14.45% 0.473 0.077 0.992 0.27% 3.48% 0.77% 0.386 0.928 
SIM Property Fund A 14.68% 12.82% 0.382 -0.37 -4.781** -1.37% 3.70% -0.60% 0.496 0.889 
STANLIB Property 
Income Fund A 16.30% 14.88% 0.47 0.236 3.048** 0.69% 2.94% 0.74% 0.355 0.994 
Fund average 14.45% 13.72% 0.443 0.035 N/A -0.48% 3.99% N/A N/A 0.867 
SAPY/Benchmark 16.12% 14.19% 0.433 N/A N/A 0 0 0 N/A 1 
Funds that 
outperform Index 9/10 6/10 6/10 1/10 N/A 6/10 N/A 3/10 N/A N/A 
** Indicates significance at the 99% confidence level. * Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level. 
4.2.3 Sharpe Ratio 2005-2018 
The average Sharpe ratio for the funds over this period was 0.443, which is close to the Sharpe 
ratio for the SAPY which was 0.433. Six out of the 10 funds have higher Sharpe ratios than the 
benchmark, which indicates they were able to produce higher risk-adjusted returns than the 
benchmark. This can likely be explained by the fact that these funds are actively managed and 
therefore differ more noticeably from the benchmark. Due to the high concentration of the 
SAPY highlighted previously, funds can allocate their holdings more evenly across stocks in 
the industry and are less concentrated in a small number of stocks which generally leads to 
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lower risk. This can be seen by the generally low standard deviation in the returns of many of 
the funds. The SAPY returns are shown to be highly volatile at 16.1%, which is higher than all 
funds except for the STANLIB property income fund A and is notably higher than the average 
of the funds at 14.45%. This illustrates the comparatively high volatility of the listed property 
market which is likely caused by the high concentration in the index which leads to larger 
swings in performance. 
The top three best performing funds according to their Sharpe ratios were the Catalyst SA 
property fund A with 0,536, Investec property equity A with 0,529 and the Alexander Forbes 
Investments property fund A with a Sharpe ratio of 0,51. Generally a Sharpe ratio of below 1 
is considered suboptimal and shows negligible risk-adjusted outperformance (Grinold and 
Kahn, 2000). However, comparing to the benchmark Sharpe ratio of 0.433 and the average 
Sharpe ratio of the funds of 0.443 these funds appear to show slight outperformance.   
The worst performing funds according to their Sharpe ratios were the Oasis property fund D 
with 0,284 and the Marriott property income fund A with 0,319. These ratios fall short of the 
Sharpe ratio of the index of 0.433 and hence they underperformed. It must be noted however, 
that the two weakest performing funds also had the lowest volatility and beta which contributed 
to their muted performance. However, despite the lower volatility these still underperformed 
on a risk-adjusted basis.  
4.2.4 Information Ratio 2005-2018 
The IR differs from the Sharpe ratio by measuring returns beyond those of a benchmark, rather 
than the risk-free rate. It is used as a measure of a unit trust manager’s skill and ability to 
generate excess returns above the benchmark. It also aids to identify consistency of 
performance by incorporating the tracking error into the calculation. An IR of 0.5 is considered 
good performance, 0.75 is considered very good and a ratio greater than 1 is considered 
excellent (Grinold and Kahn, 2000). Whilst a positive ratio indicates outperformance, IR’s 
below 0.3 are considered to not reliably outperform as they lead to lower t-statistics and hence 
lower statistical significance. This is an important consideration as t-statistics become more 
significant as the number of observations increases. Hence in a period from 2005-2018 there 
are 168 observations which increases the likelihood of the t-statistics being significant, despite 
there only being minimal outperformance.  
The average IR of the 10 funds was 0.035, which is considered to be indicative of poor or 
minimal outperformance. This low average IR was caused by the 4 lowest performing funds, 
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which all had negative ratios, indicating they significantly underperformed the benchmark. The 
best performing funds according to their IR were once again the Alexander Forbes property 
fund A, Catalyst SA property equity fund A and Investec property equity fund A, with IR of 
0.629, 0.437 and 0.369 respectively. These are the same funds which achieved the highest 
outperformance according to their Sharpe ratios. 
When testing the outperformance for significance, it was found that these 3 funds all had 
sufficiently high t-statistics such that they were considered significant at the 99% confidence 
level. It must be noted that although these funds had IR that were considered statistically 
significant, only the Alexander Forbes fund achieved an IR of above 0.5, which would be 
considered noteworthy outperformance. Furthermore, when analysing the IR of the top 
performing Alexander Forbes fund, we see that the reason for its high IR is due to its low 
tracking error of 1.38%. It only achieved a mean excess return above the benchmark of 0.87%, 
which indicates relatively weak outperformance. This highlights the issue that can occur with 
t-statistics, as although they have been shown to be significant, they do not address the extent 
or amount of outperformance. In this case the amount of time periods is high at 168 and this 
causes the t-statistic to further become significant simply due to there being a large number of 
observations. Thus, although three of the funds had statistically significant IR’s, it is evident 
that outperformance was negligible as the ratios were significant due to small tracking errors, 
with minor mean excess returns. The Catalyst SA property equity prescient fund A achieved 
the highest mean excess return above the benchmark and even this was slight at 1.19%. Thus, 
although statistically significant, outperformance was present in four of the 10 funds according 
to their IR’s. It is noted that the amount of outperformance appears to be minimal and is only 
significant due to low tracking errors and a high number of observations 
Four of the funds had negative IR over the period, which indicated the funds lost value relative 
to the benchmark and hence underperformed significantly. The t-statistics for these funds were 
also all significant at the 99% confidence level, indicating that the poor performance was likely 
not due to chance. The worst underperforming funds according to their IR were Marriot 
property income fund A, Oasis property equity fund D, SIM property fund A and Momentum 
Real Growth property fund A, whose ratios were   -0.452, -0.411, -0.370 and -2.09 respectively. 
These four underperforming funds were also the funds with the lowest Sharpe ratios, indicating 
that they underperformed under both a risk-free rate and benchmark focused metric. 
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4.2.5 Jensen’s Alpha 2005-2018 
The program Eviews was used to calculate Jensen's alpha and beta for each fund. The funds’ 
excess returns were regressed against the benchmarks excess returns. Funds with alpha’s 
greater than zero and p-values less than 0.05 are said to have outperformed the benchmark.  
Only three of the 10 funds had significant alphas, with p-values below 0.05. Once again these 
three funds are the top performing funds from the previous metrics, namely the Alexander 
Forbes Investments property equity Fund A, Catalyst SA property equity prescient fund A and 
Investec property equity fund A. These funds had alphas of 1.23%, 1.62% and 1.63% 
respectively. While these alphas are considered statistically significant, they are relatively 
small and indicate that outperformance is slight over the benchmark. These results are however 
in line with the previous two metrics above and provide evidence that these three funds 
managed to outperform the benchmark on a risk-adjusted basis and add value to investors.  
Two of the funds had negative alphas for the period, namely the Oasis property equity fund 
and the Marriot property income fund, which were two of lowest performing funds in the 
previous two metrics. However, the p-value of these two funds are not significant, therefore 
one cannot conclude with certainty that the funds had negative returns compared to the 
benchmark. The remaining five funds all had alpha’s close to zero with insignificant p-values, 
therefore one cannot claim with certainty whether there was abnormal performance in these 
funds.  
Lastly, when analysing the regressions of each of the funds, the beta of the regression should 
be analysed. Beta indicates the weight of the independent variable in the prediction of the 
dependant variable. This measures the volatility of an individual fund in comparison to the 
unsystematic risk of the market. A beta of below one indicates that the fund has less systematic 
risk than the market and hence is less risky. A beta of greater than one indicates that a fund is 
more volatile than the market and therefore is riskier. 
Over this period, all of the funds had betas of below one, with an average of 0.867, indicating 
that these funds were less volatile and hence less risky than the benchmark. The funds with the 
largest betas are the funds with the highest risk-adjusted returns, namely the Alexander Forbes 
property fund A, the catalyst property equity fund A and the Investec property equity fund A, 
with betas of 0.951, 0.945 and 0.928 respectively. The only two funds in this period with a 
significantly lower beta than the average were the Marriot and Oasis property funds, with betas 
of 0.628 and 0.609 respectively. These are the funds whose returns were the most different 
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from the market which had lower returns but also lower volatility than the other funds. These 
funds clearly had a different approach and stock selection compared to the other funds as their 
returns deviated from the benchmark the most. However, on a risk-adjusted basis these funds 
were still shown to underperform as they had the lowest Sharpe ratios as well as negative 
information ratios.  
4.2.6 Performance Summary 2005-2018 
Overall out of the 10 funds analysed for this time period, there appears to be statistically 
significant evidence that some of the funds achieved positive abnormal returns above the 
benchmark, whilst other funds significantly underperformed and diminished value to 
investors. However, while some outperformance was achieved, the amount of alpha achieved 
was small at approximately 1.5% on average. The top three performing funds showed in all 
three metrics that outperformance was achievable and significant. However, with the remaining 
funds it is evident that there was inadequate evidence to show outperformance. Overall the 
results for this period indicate that some active managers in the property unit trust industry do 
appear to possess some level of skill in outperforming the benchmark, but on average the 
evidence for outperformance is inconclusive. Whether this skill is persistent over other time 
frames will be analysed further in the next section. 
4.3 Period 2: 2008-2018 
This period includes the original 10 funds with an additional eight funds that were operational 
over this shorter period. This period includes the passive CoreShares PropTrax SAPY fund 
which aims to track the benchmark as closely as possible. The correlation in tracking error of 
the funds was once again shown to be high, which can be seen in the correlation matrix in 
appendix 1. This is also seen in figure 5 below, as the movement of excess return between 
funds is mostly similar. The most notable outliers in figure 5 are again the Marriot property 
income fund A and the Oasis property fund D which deviate substantially from the rest. The 
Coreshares Proptrax (PTXSPY) Index fund appears to have some deviations from benchmark 
in 2009 and 2012, most likely due to quarterly rebalances of holdings that led to the fund being 
notably different from the benchmark for short periods. Again the largest swings in the tracking 
error appear to occur during 2008-2009 and in 2017-2018, which are likely caused by the 
increased volatility caused by the great financial crisis in 2008 and the listed property market 
sell off which occurred in the beginning of 2018. 
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value  Beta 
Absa Property Equity Fund A 
16.30% 12.92% 0.368 0.501 5.756** 2.96% 5.91% 3.00% 0.096 0.863 
Alexander Forbes 
Investments Property Equity 
Fund A 14.59% 11.02% 0.281 0.756 8.690** 1.06% 1.41% 1.23%** 0.000 0.944 
Ashburton Multi Manager 
Property Fund B1 
13.52% 11.22% 0.319 0.389 4.465** 1.26% 3.25% 1.68%* 0.026 0.987 
Catalyst SA Property Equity 
Prescient Fund A 
14.85% 11.42% 0.304 0.564 6.478** 1.47% 2.60% 1.62%* 0.034 0.951 
CoreShares PropTrax SAPY 
ETF  
16.11% 10.49% 0.222 0.12 1.377 0.53% 4.41% 0.51% 0.703 1.006 
Coronation Property Equity 
Fund A 
13.76% 11.22% 0.313 0.406 4.659** 1.27% 3.12% 1.63%* 0.034 0.967 
Discovery Flexible Property 
Fund A 
13.30% 11.63% 0.354 0.468 5.375** 1.67% 3.57% 2.14%** 0.008 0.845 
Investec Property Equity 
Fund A 
13.99% 10.56% 0.261 0.207 2.378** 0.60% 2.92% 0.92% 0.211 0.895 
Marriott Property Income 
Fund A 
9.69% 6.81% -0.011 -0.386 -4.432** -3.15% 8.16% -1.81% 0.188 0.56 
Momentum Real Growth 
Property Fund A 
14.81% 9.84% 0.197 -0.044 -0.505 -0.12% 2.75% 0.04% 0.961 0.948 
Oasis Property Equity Fund 
D 
10.97% 6.20% -0.065 -0.396 -4.549** -3.76% 9.50% -2.45% 0.235 0.57 
Old Mutual SA Quoted 
Property Fund A 
14.51% 10.59% 0.254 0.167 1.921* 0.63% 3.79% 0.90% 0.407 0.914 
Prudential Enhanced SA 
Property Tracker Fund A 
14.80% 11.01% 0.277 0.838 9.629** 1.05% 1.26% 1.18%** 0 0.958 
Select BCI Property Fund A 
12.39% 10.10% 0.257 0.025 0.282 0.14% 5.83% 0.89% 0.506 0.754 
Sharenet BCI Property Fund 
A 
13.95% 9.73% 0.202 -0.035 -0.405 -0.22% 6.33% 0.30% 0.862 0.827 
SIM Property Fund A 
14.22% 8.63% 0.121 -0.37 -4.253** -1.33% 3.58% -1.02% 0.299 0.901 
STANLIB Property Income 
Fund A 
15.76% 10.66% 0.238 0.239 2.751** 0.71% 2.95% 0.69% 0.439 1.004 
STANLIB Property Income 
Fund B1 
15.77% 11.05% 0.262 0.367 4.221** 1.09% 2.98% 1.08% 0.234 1.005 
Risk Parity Portfolio 12.60% 15.63% 0.692 0.35 4.021** 4.39% 12.55% 6.75%* 0.031 0.513 
SAPY 15.40% 9.96% 0.198 N/A N/A 0 0 0 N/A 1 
Fund Average 14.07% 10.28% 0.231 0.212 2.463 0.33% 4.13% 0.001 0.291 0.883 
Funds that outperform 
index 14/18 13/18 14/18 4/18  N/A  N/A  N/A 6/18  N/A  N/A  





4.3.1 Nominal Performance 2008-2018 
The funds’ performance in this period appear to again be less volatile than the benchmark on 
average, which is seen by the average standard deviations of the funds compared to the 
benchmark. The standard deviation of the SAPY was 15.4% per year over the period, compared 
to the fund average of 14.1%. Furthermore, the average betas of the funds were once again 
below one, at 0.884 which shows the lower volatility of the funds. The average fund return was 
similar to that of the benchmark, with the SAPY achieving a 10% average annual return over 
the period and the funds achieving an average of 10.3%. 
4.3.2 Sharpe Ratio 2008-2018 
Looking at the performance of the SAPY benchmark, one can see that it has a fairly low Sharpe 
ratio of 0.198, which is lower than the average of the funds of 0.231. This is due to it having a 
substantially higher volatility than the funds, whilst also having lower average returns. The 
high volatility of the benchmark of 15.4% is again likely explained by its high concentration 
in a small number of funds. Hence 14 out of the 16 funds achieved lower standard deviations 
than the benchmark, due to them likely being able to more evenly allocate their funds and 
diversify more than the benchmark.  
The best performing funds based on their Sharpe ratio were the Absa property fund A, 
Discovery flexible property fund A and the Ashburton multi manager property fund B1. These 
had Sharpe ratio’s which were above 0.3, which whilst not showing overly strong performance, 
indicate that these funds were able to add some risk-adjusted value over a 10-year period. It is 
interesting to note that the risk parity portfolio of property stocks managed to outperform the 
other funds significantly based on it having significantly lower volatility as well as greater 
returns. The risk parity portfolio managed to achieve a Sharpe ratio of 0.692 which is 
approximately double as large as the best performing funds. It had relatively low standard 
deviation of 12.6% whilst achieving the highest average return of all at 15.6%. This once again 
highlights the issue with the SAPY benchmark and its high concentration, as a simple risk 
parity portfolio with equal risk weights in each funds, is able to significantly outperform the 
benchmark and other active managers by having higher returns as well as lower volatility. 
The worst performing funds in this period according to their Sharpe ratio were the Marriott 
property income fund A, Oasis property fund D and the SIM property fund A with ratios of -
0.011, -0.065 and 0.121 respectively. The negative Sharpe ratios of the two funds implied that 
the funds failed to outperform the risk-free rate over the period. They both had average returns 
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of 6.2% and 6.8% respectively, which is well below the average of the funds of 8.3%. It is 
worth noting that these underperforming funds also had the lowest volatility of the group with 
average yearly standard deviations of 9.7% for Marriot property Fund A and 11% for Oasis 
property fund D. From a risk-adjusted perspective it appears clear that the lowest performing 
funds failed to perform adequately and gave investors inferior risk-adjusted returns. 
4.3.3 Information Ratio 2008-2018 
The average information ratio for the funds in this period was 0.183, which is considered fairly 
low and indicates that on average the funds failed to add significant excess returns to the 
benchmark. The top 4 performing funds in this period with significant information ratios of 
greater than 0.5 are the Prudential enhanced SA property fund A, Alexander Forbes 
Investments property equity fund A, Catalyst SA property equity fund A and the Absa property 
equity fund A. These are almost identical to the best performing funds from the previous period, 
with the Prudential fund replacing the Investec property fund A, being the only difference. 
These four funds had sufficiently high information ratios to produce significant t-statistics. 
While 10 of the 18 funds achieved t-statistics that were sufficiently high to be statistically 
significant, only four funds had information ratio’s greater than 0.5 which exceed the threshold 
to be considered substantial outperformance.  
When one more closely analyses their tracking error and mean excess return, it is clear that the 
funds with the highest and most significant information ratios are again those with the lowest 
tracking errors. For example, the Alexander Forbes and Prudential funds had the two highest 
information ratios, however their mean excess returns were minimal at 1.05% and 1.06% 
respectively. However, these funds had substantially lower tracking errors at 1.41% and 1.26%, 
which causes their outperformance to become significant. However, it is evident that the 
magnitude of the performance is minimal and this should be considered when interpreting the 
results. The only fund which had a more noteworthy mean excess return was the Absa fund, at 
2.96%, however with a more volatile tracking error of 5.91%.  Overall these funds have shown 
statistically significant outperformance. It should be noted however, that the magnitude of the 
outperformance is minimal and that these appear significant mainly due to the low tracking 
errors these funds achieve.  
In this period there were five funds which had negative information ratios, indicating they had 
underperformed the benchmark significantly and failed to add value to investors. The 
underperforming funds were the Sharenet BCI property fund A, Momentum Real Growth 
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property fund A, SIM property fund A, Marriot property fund A and Oasis property fund D. 
These underperforming funds are the same one which had negative information ratios in the 
previous period, which indicates that their poor performance was consistent across both time 
periods.  
4.3.4 Jensen’s Alpha 2008-2018 
Out of the 18 funds in this period, six had significant Jensen’s alphas with p-values of less than 
0.05. The top three performing funds according to their significant Jensen’s alpha were the 
Discovery Flexible property fund A, Ashburton Multi Manager property fund B1 and the 
Coronation property equity fund A with alphas of 2.14%, 1.68% and 1.63% respectively. These 
funds were able to add a modest return above the benchmark indicating that they had some 
significant positive return over the period. While these returns are significant, they indicate that 
outperformance over the benchmark is not excessively large at 1.6% to 2.1% for the best 
performing funds. 
The average beta of the funds over this period was 0.847 which is considered fairly high and 
indicates that most of the funds have returns which are similar to that of the benchmark. There 
were three funds with betas of greater than one, with one of those funds being a passive ETF 
fund which is expected to have a beta of close to one. The Coreshares Proptrax SAPY ETF 
fund has the highest beta of 1.006, indicating that it accurately tracked the index over the period 
and produced similar returns. The two other funds with positive betas are the STANLIB 
property income fund B1 and STANLIB property income fund A, with betas of 1.005 and 
1.004 respectively. Whilst these two funds are not classified as passive index tracking funds, 
the managers were able to very closely replicate the returns of the benchmark. These three 
funds with the highest betas were not able to add any significant outperformance according to 
their alphas, as they were all insignificant at the 95% confidence level.  
The two funds with the lowest betas which were significantly lower than the average, were the 
Oasis property fund D and the Marriot property fund A, which are the same results as in the 
previous longer period. These funds again managed to minimise their volatility by having the 
lowest standard deviations of the funds, however they also had the lowest average returns, with 
negative Sharpe and information ratios. The performance of these two funds is evidently the 
most different from the benchmark, nevertheless based on the risk-adjusted measures these 




4.3.5 Performance Summary 2008-2018 
This period included a further eight funds to the analysis and showed that positive performance 
above the benchmark was rare, but possible. The funds on average showed slight 
outperformance based on their Sharpe ratios, however the difference was not significant. 
Furthermore, the average information ratio of the funds was 0.231 which is also insignificant 
and unimpressive. Despite this, there are some funds that like in the first period showed signs 
of outperformance across multiple measures. The worst performing funds were found to be the 
same as in period 1. 
4.4 Out of Sample Period 2008-2015 
An investigation into a shorter out of sample period from 2008-2015 was included in the 
analysis of the 18 available funds to determine whether performance was consistent across an 
out of sample period. The performance of this period can be directly compared to that of period 
2, as it contains the same funds. If the performance of the funds is found to be similar in these 
periods one can more confidently ascertain that individual funds’ performance is less 
influenced by the performance of the market but rather determined by the choices of the fund 
managers. This period also excludes the selloff and negative performance experienced in the 
property industry in 2018, thereby making it useful to see whether fund performance was 
greater than the benchmark in a bullish period for listed property. 
The performance in this period appears to be similar to the performance in the former period. 
Most funds returns are higher than the previous period 2, because this period excludes the sell-
off which occurred in 2018. The average annual return of the funds is 14.51%, which is in line 
with the benchmark return of 14.14%. Once again the volatility of the funds is on average lower 
than the benchmark at 14.43% vs. 15.80%. This is further shown by the higher average Sharpe 
ratio achieved by the funds of 0.53 vs. the benchmark ratio of 0.46. Overall this is similar to 
the performance seen in period 2. 
The best and worst performing funds in this period appear to also be highly comparable to 
those in period 2. The highest performing funds on average were again the Absa property equity 
fund A, Discovery Flexible property fund A, Prudential Enhanced SA property tracker fund A 
and the Alexander Forbes Investments property equity fund A. The underperforming funds 
were also identical to the previous period, with the Marriott property income fund A, Oasis 
property equity fund D and SIM property fund A being suboptimal. This reinforces the fact 
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that these over and underperforming funds appear to perform consistently despite the 
performance of the market. 
It is interesting to note that the performance of the risk parity portfolio was not as strong as in 
period 2. The risk parity portfolio failed to have a significant alpha and its information ratio 
was considered low and insignificant at only 0.191. However, this is somewhat expected 
because this portfolio has the largest tracking error and is most different from the other funds. 
This can be seen by its very low beta of only 0.437 which is substantially smaller than those of 
the other funds. The risk parity portfolio did however achieve the largest mean return of 18.06% 
as well as the largest Sharpe ratio of 0.885, indicating that it still provided strong risk-adjusted 
performance. The reason for its insignificant alpha and information ratio is likely because this 
period excludes the selloff of property funds after 2015 and therefore does not contain the large 
downward swing in the market. The selloff period is the one in which the risk parity fund is 
expected to have performed best, due to its lower volatility and increased diversification over 
the benchmark. 
Overall the out of sample period confirms that the performance in this period is comparable to 
the performance of the previous periods. There appears to be similar levels of outperformance 
present, with only a small number of funds showing significant outperformance across multiple 
metrics. Fund performance therefore appears to be mostly unaffected by movements in the 
market, as performance in this period does not differ significantly despite this being a mainly 
positive period for property stocks. However, it is worth noting that the risk parity portfolio 
does not stand out significantly in this period as it does not include the negative performance 
of the property sector which occurred in 2018. This indicates that the risk parity portfolio 
therefore seems to outperform the benchmark and other funds more significantly in more 






















Absa Property Equity Fund A 15.05% 17.51% 0.710 0.807 9.380** 3.95%** 0.007 0.920 
Alexander Forbes Investments 
Property Equity Fund A 15.02% 15.03% 0.546 0.622 7.224** 1.27%** 0.003 0.947 
Ashburton Multi Manager 
Property Fund B1 13.54% 15.81% 0.664 0.460 5.339** 2.84%** 0.003 0.841 
Catalyst SA Property Equity 
Prescient Fund A 15.46% 15.64% 0.571 0.560 6.501** 1.77% 0.064 0.964 
CoreShares PropTrax SAPY ETF  16.68% 14.80% 0.479 0.129 1.504 0.63% 0.733 1.005 
Coronation Property 
 Equity Fund A 14.34% 15.36% 0.596 0.437 5.074** 1.97%* 0.017 0.897 
Discovery Flexible Property 
Fund A 13.63% 16.63% 0.719 0.720 8.363** 3.61%** 0.000 0.846 
Investec Property Equity Fund A 14.48% 15.16% 0.576 0.386 4.486** 1.71%* 0.032 0.906 
Marriott Property Income Fund 
A 10.51% 7.69% 0.083 -1.012 
-
11.762** -3.83%** 0.000 0.643 
Momentum Real Growth 
Property Fund A 15.13% 13.89% 0.468 -0.081 -0.936 0.19% 0.859 0.941 
Oasis Property Equity Fund D 11.24% 11.15% 0.386 -0.369 -4.284 -0.26% 0.894 0.628 
Old Mutual SA Quoted Property 
Fund A 15.62% 14.93% 0.519 0.283 3.284 0.99% 0.322 0.973 
Prudential Enhanced SA 
Property Tracker Fund A 15.24% 15.56% 0.574 1.228 14.269** 1.70%** 0.000 0.962 
Select BCI Property Fund A 12.59% 13.81% 0.555 -0.052 -0.608 1.56% 0.359 0.742 
Sharenet BCI Property Fund A 15.09% 14.83% 0.531 0.147 1.714 1.33% 0.410 0.913 
SIM Property Fund A 14.55% 12.28% 0.375 -0.481 -5.589 -1.10% 0.383 0.896 
STANLIB Property Income Fund 
A 15.77% 15.34% 0.541 0.462 5.362 1.32% 0.158 0.983 
STANLIB Property Income Fund 
B1 15.77% 15.73% 0.565 0.612 7.109** 1.71% 0.068 0.983 
SAPY 15.80% 14.14% 0.463 N/A N/A 0.00% N/A 1.000 
Risk Parity 12.70% 18.06% 0.885 0.191 2.217 0.63% 0.063 0.437 
Average 14.43% 14.51% 0.525 0.270 3.135 1.19% 0.240 0.888 
Funds that outperform Index  17/18 13/18 15/18 6/18 N/A 7/18 N/A N/A 






4.5 Period 3: 2015-2018  
This period encompasses the largest amount of funds as it includes newer funds which opened 
after 2008. The full 34 funds are included in this period, of which five being passive funds aim 
to track the benchmark directly. This shorter period emphasises the significant sell-off in listed 
property shares and is therefore useful in determining how active funds performed relative to 
the benchmark in a declining market.  
4.5.1 Correlation of Tracking Error 
The correlation of the funds tracking errors is shown in table 3. On average the correlation 
between funds tracking error is again shown to be high, with many of the funds having 
correlations of greater than 0.5. Some of the funds such as the ABSA property fund A (ABPE), 
STANLIB property income fund A (STPI) and the STANLIB property income fund B1 
(SPIFB1) have low and negative correlations to other funds. This is likely due to these funds 
having the largest betas of over one and therefore being more volatile and the most different 
from the others. Furthermore, the two STANLIB funds have almost identical returns and 
standard deviations, with similar betas over one and almost identical tracking errors, hence 
explaining their joint lack of correlation to the other funds. Furthermore, the two Investec funds 
A and H both had highly similar betas of 0.856 and 0.857 and the same tracking error of 3.30%. 
Thus their correlations were one over the period, illustrating that the two funds are expected to 
perform highly similarly to one another.  
Overall, this period has similarly high levels of correlation between the funds tracking error as 
the previous two periods, whilst having a small number of higher beta funds which differ 
significantly in variability from the others. Given the high correlation in tracking errors, we 




Table 9: Tracking Error Correlation 2015-2018 
2015-2018 ISPU CSPEF CPEF PPFA MPIF RBPF OPEFD OMRE SAPF STPI ABPE ASMPB1 PTXSPY DFPF PEPI VAPF DWPF SPIFB1 AFICA FMFCA CSAPF PTXTEN HPPFC PPFH MCPFA NIPCA DSPFA MXPR PEPTF SAPIF SSPF1 STPROP SLPCA TNICA
ISPU 1.000
CSPEF 0.557 1.000
CPEF 0.648 0.439 1.000
PPFA 0.640 0.387 0.743 1.000
MPIF 0.479 0.339 0.759 0.644 1.000
RBPF 0.325 0.775 0.116 0.234 -0.004 1.000
OPEFD 0.619 0.497 0.883 0.753 0.746 0.188 1.000
OMRE 0.588 0.669 0.804 0.765 0.772 0.450 0.878 1.000
SAPF 0.326 0.687 0.570 0.234 0.464 0.448 0.515 0.659 1.000
STPI 0.141 0.300 -0.139 -0.430 -0.363 0.279 -0.128 -0.119 0.427 1.000
ABPE 0.090 0.193 -0.322 -0.370 -0.618 0.320 -0.187 -0.303 -0.044 0.675 1.000
ASMPB1 0.867 0.448 0.637 0.723 0.372 0.295 0.644 0.551 0.221 0.069 0.146 1.000
PTXSPY 0.011 0.319 0.191 0.171 0.083 0.352 0.117 0.241 0.381 0.033 -0.137 0.032 1.000
DFPF 0.680 0.452 0.734 0.978 0.673 0.289 0.780 0.814 0.271 -0.387 -0.339 0.723 0.169 1.000
PEPI 0.625 0.440 0.688 0.623 0.558 0.129 0.716 0.616 0.455 -0.108 -0.109 0.611 0.151 0.640 1.000
VAPF 0.249 0.512 0.577 0.345 0.706 0.307 0.536 0.646 0.660 -0.118 -0.367 0.139 0.263 0.390 0.491 1.000
DWPF 0.692 0.624 0.633 0.716 0.549 0.411 0.750 0.761 0.391 -0.040 0.027 0.714 0.118 0.791 0.588 0.382 1.000
SPIFB1 0.136 0.300 -0.144 -0.436 -0.367 0.279 -0.134 -0.124 0.425 1.000 0.677 0.063 0.030 -0.392 -0.110 -0.118 -0.045 1.000
AFICA 0.651 0.608 0.751 0.683 0.694 0.320 0.783 0.825 0.610 0.019 -0.119 0.570 0.066 0.708 0.670 0.541 0.754 0.013 1.000
FMFCA 0.589 0.476 0.532 0.729 0.386 0.426 0.716 0.652 0.160 -0.162 0.056 0.737 0.124 0.751 0.539 0.205 0.775 -0.169 0.607 1.000
CSAPF 0.648 0.558 0.665 0.511 0.613 0.229 0.603 0.621 0.607 0.072 -0.131 0.486 0.217 0.541 0.727 0.520 0.560 0.073 0.668 0.309 1.000
PTXTEN 0.044 0.293 0.173 0.029 0.111 0.223 0.214 0.201 0.372 0.038 0.033 0.060 0.551 0.068 0.462 0.511 0.130 0.039 0.108 0.064 0.373 1.000
HPPFC 0.710 0.387 0.747 0.913 0.645 0.242 0.687 0.696 0.234 -0.408 -0.343 0.746 0.053 0.883 0.619 0.401 0.620 -0.412 0.653 0.619 0.536 0.032 1.000
PPFH 0.640 0.386 0.743 1.000 0.644 0.233 0.753 0.765 0.233 -0.430 -0.370 0.722 0.171 0.978 0.623 0.345 0.716 -0.436 0.683 0.729 0.510 0.029 0.913 1.000
MCPFA 0.387 0.403 0.336 0.624 0.394 0.329 0.407 0.473 0.066 -0.349 -0.168 0.481 -0.003 0.663 0.354 0.247 0.711 -0.349 0.480 0.612 0.340 0.029 0.592 0.624 1.000
NIPCA 0.487 0.413 0.788 0.665 0.767 0.023 0.782 0.755 0.579 -0.146 -0.324 0.453 0.016 0.661 0.743 0.562 0.635 -0.149 0.861 0.443 0.666 0.115 0.624 0.665 0.395 1.000
DSPFA 0.383 0.670 0.446 0.424 0.322 0.526 0.583 0.626 0.448 0.060 0.121 0.389 0.377 0.492 0.433 0.359 0.664 0.059 0.494 0.539 0.452 0.364 0.331 0.424 0.428 0.360 1.000
MXPR 0.486 0.589 0.469 0.539 0.205 0.505 0.577 0.539 0.323 0.045 0.309 0.597 0.149 0.553 0.607 0.306 0.649 0.043 0.611 0.703 0.382 0.256 0.477 0.538 0.431 0.547 0.553 1.000
PEPTF 0.625 0.439 0.689 0.623 0.557 0.128 0.716 0.616 0.455 -0.108 -0.109 0.612 0.151 0.640 1.000 0.489 0.588 -0.109 0.670 0.538 0.727 0.463 0.619 0.622 0.354 0.743 0.433 0.606 1.000
SAPIF 0.526 0.496 0.415 0.364 0.310 0.394 0.293 0.416 0.461 0.042 -0.115 0.398 0.246 0.392 0.616 0.418 0.279 0.046 0.345 0.127 0.671 0.457 0.464 0.363 0.220 0.361 0.277 0.313 0.616 1.000
SSPF1 0.618 0.586 0.733 0.868 0.638 0.458 0.692 0.800 0.478 -0.247 -0.296 0.663 0.192 0.846 0.562 0.521 0.646 -0.252 0.738 0.628 0.531 0.075 0.924 0.868 0.588 0.659 0.428 0.537 0.562 0.437 1.000
STPROP 0.239 0.461 0.200 0.186 0.113 0.475 0.152 0.351 0.406 0.130 0.082 0.172 0.242 0.204 0.159 0.248 0.214 0.130 0.332 0.179 0.235 0.108 0.230 0.187 0.074 0.137 0.223 0.237 0.158 0.262 0.390 1.000
SLPCA 0.599 0.535 0.411 0.408 0.265 0.456 0.321 0.452 0.503 0.153 -0.028 0.472 0.282 0.444 0.613 0.354 0.414 0.156 0.398 0.237 0.714 0.375 0.458 0.407 0.292 0.370 0.374 0.342 0.613 0.919 0.454 0.267 1.000
TNICA 0.695 0.536 0.706 0.600 0.615 0.343 0.814 0.723 0.371 0.001 -0.004 0.668 0.128 0.677 0.531 0.420 0.826 -0.006 0.708 0.769 0.503 0.114 0.574 0.600 0.488 0.565 0.631 0.580 0.531 0.188 0.579 0.144 0.274 1.000
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Figure 6 further highlights the correlation of the funds excess returns and makes it evident that 
the returns of most funds are highly correlated. The three largest outliers with the largest 
deviations from the rest were the Nedgroup Investments fund A (NIPCA) and the Marriot 
property fund A (MPIF) and the Oasis property fund D (OPEFD). These funds had the largest 
tracking error and hence the largest volatility and deviations from the benchmark return. These 
funds also had the smallest betas at 0.347, 0.374 and 0.383 respectively. Despite these outliers, 
it remains evident that the excess returns of the funds on average are correlated, indicating that 
the returns of the funds on average are expected to be similar. 
4.5.2 Nominal Performance Measures 2015-2018 
Over this period the benchmark return was 1.03% per annum, illustrating the significant 
downward trend in listed property performance which began in early 2018. The average mean 
returns of all the funds over this period was 2%, indicating that on average the funds appeared 
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to outperform the benchmark. Furthermore, the average volatility of the funds was lower than 
the index at 12.3%, compared to the SAPY with 13.8%. Table 10 below provides the summary 
of the funds returns and performance metrics over the period.  




















Absa Property Equity 
Fund A 17.96% 6.87% 0.000 0.683 4.732** 5.84% 8.56% 6.77% 0.115 1.156 
Alexander Forbes 
Investments Fund A 12.83% 3.05% -0.005 1.357 9.405** 2.03% 1.49% 1.60%** 0.01 0.927 
Ampersand SCI Flexible 
Property Income Fund A 10.12% 2.37% -0.005 0.209 1.446 1.35% 6.45% -0.66% 0.771 0.660 
Ashburton Multi Manager 
Property Fund B1 12.69% 2.28% -0.006 0.610 4.226** 1.25% 2.05% 0.74% 0.389 0.913 
Autus Prime Property 
Fund A 11.43% -0.11% -0.008 -0.168 -1.161 -1.14% 6.81% -2.78% 0.338 0.723 
Catalyst SA Property 
Equity Prescient Fund A 12.77% 3.64% -0.004 1.049 7.270** 2.61% 2.49% 2.10% 0.065 0.913 
Citadel SA Property H4 
Fund B1 12.70% 1.79% -0.007 0.439 3.044** 0.76% 1.74% 0.27% 0.686 0.916 
Coronation Property 
Equity Fund A 11.55% 2.34% -0.005 0.365 2.529** 1.31% 3.59% 0.23% 0.860 0.818 
Discovery Flexible 
Property Fund A 11.74% 2.03% -0.006 0.278 1.927* 1.00% 3.60% -0.01% 0.993 0.829 
Hollard Prime Property 
Fund B 11.90% 4.67% -0.003 1.007 6.974** 3.64% 3.62% 2.69% 0.071 0.839 
Investec Property Equity 
Fund A 12.09% 1.84% -0.006 0.247 1.714* 0.82% 3.30% -0.03% 0.981 0.856 
Investec Property Equity 
Fund H 12.09% 2.30% -0.006 0.386 2.672** 1.27% 3.30% 0.42% 0.754 0.857 
Marriott Property Income 
Fund A 7.78% 3.15% -0.003 0.204 1.411 2.12% 10.42% -1.58% 0.596 0.374 
Mazi Asset Management 
Prime Property Fund A 12.23% 0.94% -0.007 -0.023 -0.158 -0.09% 3.99% -0.97% 0.581 0.851 
Momentum Real Growth 
Property Fund A 13.68% 2.34% -0.006 0.662 4.586** 1.31% 1.98% 1.21% 0.234 0.982 
Nedgroup Investments 
Property Fund A 10.55% -0.21% -0.008 -0.095 -0.658 -1.24% 13.02% -5.10% 0.293 0.347 
Oasis Property Equity 
Fund D 9.52% -2.69% -0.009 -0.319 -2.209 -3.72% 11.66% -7.37% 0.076 0.383 
Old Mutual SA Quoted 
Property Fund A 10.97% 2.39% -0.005 0.255 1.767* 1.36% 5.33% -0.16% 0.936 0.742 
Optimum BCI Property 
Fund A 12.55% 0.32% -0.008 -0.148 -1.023 -0.70% 4.78% -1.56% 0.482 0.855 
Plexus Wealth BCI 
Property Fund A 12.71% 3.00% -0.005 0.426 2.949** 1.97% 4.62% 1.20% 0.584 0.869 
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Prudential Enhanced SA 
Property Tracker Fund A 12.96% 1.75% -0.007 0.484 3.354** 0.72% 1.49% 0.34% 0.578 0.936 
Prudential Enhanced SA 
Property Tracker Fund D 12.96% 1.86% -0.007 0.559 3.875** 0.83% 1.49% 0.46% 0.460 0.936 
Select BCI Property Fund 
A 12.10% 2.04% -0.006 0.248 1.717* 1.01% 4.07% 0.07% 0.968 0.841 
Sesfikile BCI Property 
Fund A1 11.90% 4.92% -0.002 0.988 6.842** 3.89% 3.94% 2.90% 0.081 0.832 
Sharenet BCI Property 
Fund A 9.70% 2.28% -0.005 0.132 0.912 1.26% 9.55% -1.64% 0.634 0.510 
SIM Property Fund A 12.95% 0.85% -0.008 -0.066 -0.457 -0.17% 2.61% -0.63% 0.608 0.923 
STANLIB Property 
Income Fund A 14.68% 0.67% -0.009 -0.104 -0.717 -0.35% 3.42% -0.14% 0.934 1.036 
STANLIB Property 
Income Fund B1 14.71% 1.05% -0.009 0.008 0.053 0.03% 3.47% 0.25% 0.888 1.037 
True North IP Enhanced 
Property Fund A 8.41% 1.73% -0.004 0.063 0.436 0.70% 11.14% -3.08% 0.379 0.361 
Passive Funds           
CoreShares PropTrax 
SAPY ETF  13.87% 1.56% -0.007 0.316 2.187* 0.53% 1.69% 0.04% 0.545 0.999 
CoreShares PropTrax Ten 
ETF  13.92% 2.54% -0.006 0.418 2.899** 1.51% 3.61% 0.11% 0.459 0.976 
Satrix Property Index 
Fund A1 13.60% 1.57% -0.007 0.803 5.564** 0.54% 0.67% 0.04% 0.171 0.986 
STANLIB SA Property 
ETF  13.73% 1.82% -0.007 0.439 3.041** 0.80% 1.82% 0.06% 0.439 0.987 
Sygnia Listed Property 
Index Fund A 13.60% 1.68% -0.007 0.930 6.445** 0.66% 0.70% 0.05% 0.105 0.985 
Risk Parity Portfolio 12.59% 7.92% 0.078 0.819 4.914** 6.89% 8.42% 5.30% 0.174 0.731 
SAPY 13.79% 1.03% -0.008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 
Fund Average 12.32% 2.02% -0.006 0.372 2.576 0.99% 4.48% -0.18% 0.527 0.828 
** Indicates significance at the 99% confidence level. * Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level. 
 
4.5.3 Sharpe Ratio 2015-2018 
All of the funds in this period had negative Sharpe ratio’s due to the mean returns being lower 
than the risk-free rate over this period. This highlights the substantial underperformance of the 
property sector over this period as it was unable to achieve returns greater than the risk-free 
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rate. As discussed earlier, a negative Sharpe ratio can be difficult to analyse and utilise because 
it gives misleading results. This is because a negative excess return with large volatility leads 
to the Sharpe ratio being less negative, indicating better performance (Israelsen, 2005). 
Therefore, ranking negative Sharpe ratios becomes problematic, as funds can achieve a larger 
ratio by having high volatility with negative excess returns. Given that the interpretation of 
negative standard Sharpe ratio’s is problematic and does not lead to useful comparisons, 
modified Sharpe ratios have been calculated based on Israelsen (2005).  
Using the modified Sharpe ratios to rank the best performing funds, we see that the best 
performers were the ABSA property equity fund A, Sesfikile BCI property fund A1 and 
Hollard prime property fund B. The Sharpe ratio for the SAPY was notably low in this period, 
with it being outperformed by all but four of the funds. This was because it once again had 
higher average volatility than the funds, whilst achieving a return of 1.02% a year compared to 
the fund average of 2%. The poor risk-adjusted performance of the SAPY over this period 
again highlights the concerns of its high concentration, which in turn diminishes its ability to 
provide satisfactory risk-adjusted performance. Many of the funds achieved higher returns over 
this period with less volatility than the SAPY which can be seen as beneficial for investors.  
However, a number of funds managed to underperform substantially by having higher volatility 
and lower returns than the benchmark which is undesirable. These poor performing funds were 
the STANLIB property income fund A, Oasis property equity fund D and STANLIB property 
income fund B1, all of which underperformed the benchmark according to their Sharpe ratios.  
Based on average returns and volatility, the best performing funds were the ABSA property 
fund A, Sesfikile BCI property fund A1 and Hollard Prime property fund B, with returns of 
6.9%, 4.9% and 4.7% respectively. The ABSA property fund achieved the highest return by 
also having the largest volatility, with a standard deviation of 18%, significantly above the 
average of 12.3%. It is worth noting that the risk parity portfolio was the only one to achieve a 
positive Sharpe ratio of 0.078, with the highest average return of 7.9% over the period. 
4.5.4 Information Ratio 2015-2018 
Looking at the information ratio of the funds, it appears that on average there was some positive 
outperformance, with a mean information ratio of 0.385. The three top performing funds with 
information ratios above one were the Alexander Forbes Investments property fund A, the 
Catalyst SA property equity prescient fund A and the Hollard Prime property fund B. These 
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funds provided significant outperformance according to their information ratio’s and 
successfully managed to outperform the index. On closer inspection we see that the Alexander 
Forbes Fund A with the highest information ratio of 1.357, achieved this by having a 
significantly low tracking error of 1.49%. Its mean excess return over the benchmark was slight 
at only 2.03%. While outperformance appears to be significant, it is worth noting that the effect 
size of the outperformance is not substantial. The other two top performing funds achieved a 
more noteworthy excess return of 2.1% and 3.64% respectively, albeit with larger tracking 
errors. This reemphasises the important consideration when analysing the significance of 
information ratios for all the funds. The effect size and degree of outperformance should be 
considered, not only whether it is significant or not.  
From table 10 it appears as though the outperformance measured by the information ratio is 
statistically significant across the majority of funds, as they all show significant t-statistics. 
With reference to the t-statistics, the value is calculated by multiplying the information ratio 
by the √T and needs to be above a certain critical value in order to be significant. In this period 
in order to be considered statistically significant mean excess return over the benchmark, the 
information ratio needs to be larger than 0.244 in order to produce a significant t-statistic at the 
95% confidence level. This can be problematic as an information ratio of 0.244 is generally 
considered weak outperformance according to Grinold and Kahn (2000). Thus, in order to be 
considered significant outperformance a hurdle value is used for the IR of greater than 0.5. This 
will require a t-statistic of 3.34 in order for a funds outperformance to be considered 
significantly robust (Goodwin, 1998).  
Given this hurdle value, only eight of the 29 active funds achieved an information ratio above 
0.5, indicating good performance relative to the benchmark. 14 funds achieved minimal 
outperformance with an information ratio between 0.2-0.5. Seven funds had negative 
information ratios indicating they destroyed value relative to the benchmark. 
It should further be noted that many funds achieve significant information ratios of greater than 
0.5 simply by having very low tracking errors, with minor outperformance over the benchmark. 
For example, the Prudential Enhanced SA Property Tracker Fund D achieved a significant 
information ratio of 0.559, indicating outperformance over the benchmark. However, it’s 
tracking error was one of the lowest at 1.49% and its mean excess return was only 0.83% which 
does not indicate substantial outperformance over the benchmark. This can further be seen with 
the passive funds, which unsurprisingly have some of the lowest tracking errors. The Sygnia 
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Listed Property Index Fund A has a low tracking error at 0.7%, with a mean excess return of 
0.66% indicating that outperformance was minimal. However, it’s information ratio is one of 
the highest at 0.93, leading one to believe it had strong outperformance over the period. 
Ultimately this emphasises the important concern of considering the effect size when 
interpreting the significance of these results. While many funds achieved statistically 
significant t-statistics, indicating outperformance over the benchmark, when one considers the 
minimal size of this outperformance is becomes less remarkable, as the amount of 
outperformance is small and only significant due to the returns being highly similar to that of 
the benchmark. This further highlights the fact that most funds fail to achieve noteworthy or 
substantial outperformance over the benchmark.  
4.5.5 Jensen’s Alpha 2015-2018 
Moving onto the Jensen’s alphas of the funds over this period, only the Alexander Forbes 
Investments property fund was able to achieve a significant alpha at the 95% confidence level, 
with a p-value of 0.0067 and an alpha of 1.6%. Four funds achieved significant alphas at the 
90% confidence levels, with the best performers being Sesfikile BCI property fund A1, Hollard 
Prime property fund B and Catalyst SA property equity fund A with alphas of 2.9%, 2.69% 
and 2.1% respectively. These results are in line with the Sharpe and information ratio results, 
as these funds appear to be the strongest performers over the period. It should be noted that the 
alpha’s achieved were not statistically robust at the 95% confidence level and were further not 
substantial at 2.1%-2.9%. 
Of the underperforming funds with negative alphas, the Oasis property equity fund A had the 
most significant alpha of -0.6% with a p-value of 0.076. While not statistically significant at 
the 95% confidence level, this reinforces the fact that the Oasis property equity fund is again 
one of the weakest performing funds in this more recent time period as well. 
The average beta for the active funds over this time period was 0.8, which is lower than the 
longer time periods. This indicates that on average the funds avoided tracking the market 
directly over this period, which is logical given the significant poor performance that the SAPY 























SAPY ETF  




13.92% 2.54% -0.006 0.418 2.510 0.11% 0.459 0.976 3.61% 
Satrix Property 
Index Fund A1 
13.60% 1.57% -0.007 0.803 4.819 0.04% 0.171 0.986 0.67% 
STANLIB SA 
Property ETF  




13.60% 1.68% -0.007 0.930 5.582 0.05% 0.105 0.985 0.70% 
Risk Parity 
Portfolio 
12.59% 7.92% 0.078 0.819 4.914 5.30% 0.175 0.731 8.42% 
SAPY 13.79% 1.03% -0.008 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.000 N/A  
 
Of the five passive funds in this period, performance across funds was comparable, with similar 
returns and volatility, which is to be expected. The fund with the largest information ratio was 
the Sygnia Listed Property Index Fund A with 0.93. None of the passive funds had significant 
alpha’s, which is to be expected and they all had betas of close to one. The CoreShares 
PropTrax Ten was the best risk-adjusted performer, with the largest mean return, likely because 
it tracks a different benchmark and has maximum weighting of 10% per share which reduces 
its holding in one specific share. Looking at the tracking error of the funds, the best performing 
passive funds were the Satrix and Sygnia funds. These had tracking errors of 0.67% and 0.7% 
respectively, which shows that they successfully tracked the index with minimal deviations 
from the benchmark returns. These two funds hence also had the highest information ratios out 
of the passive funds, of 0.803 and 0.930 respectively. The passive funds had on average higher 
information ratios than the active funds in this period, because they had substantially lower 
tracking errors than active funds whilst still achieving somewhat larger mean returns than the 
benchmark. This reinforces that the information ratio’s over this period can be somewhat 
misleading, as many funds achieved significantly high ratios simply because they had low 
tracking errors, not because they had notable excess returns over the benchmark. 
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4.5.6. Risk Parity Portfolio Performance 2015-2018 
The best performing fund in this period was the risk parity portfolio of property stocks, which 
had an average return of 7.9% for the period and the only positive Sharpe ratio of 0.078. It 
achieved the largest Sharpe ratio as well as one of the highest information ratio of 0.82, which 
was above the average of 0.385. Whilst having an insignificant Jensen’s alpha, this portfolio 
managed the largest average yearly returns while having a beta of 0.73, indicating its risk was 
well below that of the market. This indicates that having a diversified equally distributed risk 
weightings of stocks may be the most successful way to achieve superior returns in the property 
industry. This is again likely due to the high concentration of the SAPY in a small number of 
large REIT’s which increases its volatility. The strong performance of the risk parity portfolio 
was also seen in the previous period as it achieved higher risk-adjusted and nominal 
performance compared to both the active and passive funds.  
Despite it having the largest tracking error over the period at 8.42%, this is acceptable given it 
achieved lower volatility than the benchmark and substantially higher mean returns. Given the 
shortcomings and drawbacks of the main property benchmark, the SAPY, investors appear to 
be better off in a risk parity portfolio of property stocks rather than an active or passive fund. 
Passive funds have been shown to effectively track their benchmark, however if the benchmark 
is flawed and overly concentrated, investors are better off investing in a different approach 
such as a risk parity portfolio. 
4.5.7 Performance Summary 2015-2018 
Overall this period has given insight into how the funds performed when markets were bearish. 
The previous time periods were biased towards strong performance of the property industry, 
however this highlights the notable market downturn which began in 2018. Overall the results 
in this period are somewhat mixed. Most funds managed to achieve similar or higher returns 
than the SAPY whilst having lower volatility. Furthermore, most funds achieved 
outperforming Sharpe ratio’s, with a small number of funds managing to achieve positive risk-
adjusted performance across the 3 performance metrics. Whilst there appears to be evidence 
that the majority of the funds achieve similar returns to the benchmark with less volatility, this 
was not shown to be statistically significant. Only one fund achieved a significant alpha over 
the period and a small number achieved noteworthy t-statistics with significant information 
ratios. Furthermore, these outperforming t-statistics were mainly achieved through low 
tracking errors and not through notable excess returns over the benchmark. Thus the evidence 
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for this period indicates that outperformance of active funds was inconclusive. The standout 
performing fund in this period was the risk parity portfolio which achieved the highest mean 
returns and excess return over the benchmark, whilst having lower volatility. This highlights 
the main concern with the SAPY benchmark due to its over-concentration in a small number 
of stocks which causes it to be excessively risky and achieve suboptimal returns compared to 
a risk parity portfolio.  
The best performing active funds were the Alexander Forbes Investments property equity fund 
A, Catalyst SA property equity prescient fund A and Hollard Prime property fund B, all with 
information ratios greater than one and Jensen’s alpha’s of 1.6%, 2.1% and 2.69% While 
outperformance in these funds was significant, the magnitude should still be noted. 
Furthermore, the volatility of the majority of funds was significantly lower than the benchmark 
which is another benefit to active management in the sector, which can diversify better than 
the overly concentrated benchmark. 
4.6 Summary of Results and Comparison to Literature Review 
The analysis of the 34 South African listed property unit trust has overall shown that 
outperformance of funds is inconclusive and minimal. Over multiple periods and through 
numerous metrics it has been shown that funds in this sector fail to provide robust and 
significant evidence of outperformance of the benchmark. A small number of funds such as the 
Alexander Forbes, Absa and Catalyst property funds showed that statistically significant 
outperformance was achievable over numerous time periods. These funds should be noted for 
their superior risk-adjusted returns over the benchmark and their peers. However, the 
outperformance of even the strongest funds listed above has been shown to be minimal and 
mainly significant due to their low tracking errors and similar returns to the benchmark. 
Furthermore, on average it is evident that the majority of funds show minimal significant 
evidence of superior abnormal returns over the benchmark, with some funds like the Oasis 
property fund and Marriot property fund showing significant underperformance over multiple 
periods. Despite the shortcomings and issues with the listed property benchmark, managers 
mostly failed to outperform and add value to investors. The best performing fund over the most 
recent time periods from 2008 onwards was shown to be the risk parity fund of property stocks 
which achieved significant excess returns over the benchmark while having notably lower 
volatility than the benchmark. The results therefore make it evident that active managers in this 
sector fail to outperform and significant alpha and value to investors. 
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The findings of this research are in contrast to the early studies by Damodaran and Liu (1993) 
and Kallberg, Liu and Trzcinka (2000) who found that active managers in the property could 
achieve positive abnormal alpha. Damodaran and Liu’s (1993) discovery of material 
information being present in the appraisal process which had a material impact on the pricing 
of REIT’s was not found to be present in the sample of South African property fund managers 
as they failed to outperform. While Kallberg, Liu and Trzcinka (2000) confirmed the existence 
of outperformance in US property unit trusts, the same was not found in the South African 
market, as managers failed to outperform notably. 
However, the results of this study are in line with more recent international research by Lin and 
Yung (2004) who also found insignificant outperformance in their sample of US property unit 
trusts from 1993-2001. Their findings were that fund performance was mainly determined by 
the performance of the real estate sector as a whole. The same can be said for the results of this 
study, as there is evidently high correlation amongst the funds tracking errors and on average 
the funds returns are similar to those of the benchmark. These results are further supported by 
Chiang et al. (2008), who similarly found that their sample of US property unit trusts failed to 
produce abnormal excess returns over the benchmark.  
Comparing the results of this study to other South African general unit trust performance 
analysis, we see that similar results have been found across other asset classes. A recent study 
by Bertolis and Hayes (2014) showed that general equity unit trusts achieved slight 
outperformance the FTSE/JSE All share index over the period 1994-2012, but that this 
outperformance was not persistent and repeatable. These results are further similar to broader 
international unit trust studies which also indicate that there is minimal outperformance of 
active managers. Jensen (1968) was the first to show that active managers underperformed their 
benchmarks and failed to add value to investors. Grinblatt and Titman (1989a) further showed 
that after taking fees into consideration, active equity unit trust managers failed to show 
superior performance over their benchmark. These results are therefore in line with results of 
the general equity unit trust literature, as the evidence for outperformance of active managers 
is inconclusive. 
These results are further in line with the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis, 
as active management and stock selection have failed to significantly outperform the market 
benchmark. This implies that the markets are semi-strong. This is in line with previous South 
African literature by Smith and Dyakova (2014) on market efficiency, who showed that South 
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African equity markets were at least semi-strong form efficient. Furthermore, these results are 
in contrast to the alternative theory presented earlier, namely the Grossman and Stiglitz 
Hypothesis. Despite their claim that markets cannot be efficient as this would lead to zero 
return on investors gathering information, the results of this study indicate that active managers 
are unable to notably outperform. This reinforces the idea that the South African listed property 
sector appears to be at least semi-strong efficient as there is minimal outperformance of active 
managers.  
Overall the results of this study are in line with more recent international studies which found 
similar lack of performance across property unit trusts. Thus there appears to be minimal 
evidence to suggest that active managers in this sector are able to produce abnormal excess 
returns, which is in line with the efficient market hypothesis. If we further factor in survivorship 
bias into the results of this study, the underperformance of funds would likely be even greater. 
The funds which were excluded due to being closed would likely have been underperforming 
funds and hence would have made the evidence of underperforming funds even greater. Despite 
the shortcomings of the South African listed property benchmark, active funds were still unable 



















Active vs passive management is an ongoing debate within the financial literature, with mostly 
inconclusive and mixed findings as to which strategy provides superior returns to investors. 
This study set out to analyse the performance of unit trusts in the South African listed property 
sector to determine whether active managers are able to outperform their benchmark and 
thereby add value to investors. 34 South African property unit trusts were analysed to determine 
whether outperformance was present across multiple time periods. The results have shown that 
active funds on average do not add significant and persistent outperformance across a number 
of performance metrics. Whilst a small number of funds such as the Alexander Forbes 
Investments and ABSA property funds showed significant outperformance across multiple 
periods, on average the funds showed mixed performance and were not able to outperform the 
benchmark significantly. The Sharpe and information ratios further showed that some funds 
are able to outperform the benchmark by achieving slightly larger mean returns whilst having 
lower volatility than the SAPY. However, when conducting hypothesis testing on the 
information ratio as well as Jensen’s alpha, this outperformance was shown to be minimal and 
only present in a small number of funds.  
Ultimately these results are in line with numerous international studies on property unit trusts, 
since despite the theoretical reasons as to why property funds may be expected to outperform, 
outperformance of South African funds has been shown to be insignificant. This study has 
highlighted a main concern with the South African property sector, namely the issues of the 
main listed property benchmark, the SAPY. This index has been shown to be highly 
concentrated and therefore excessively risky, as well as being unrepresentative of the property 
unit trust sector. Despite these shortcomings, fund managers were on average unable to 
outperform the index, although they did on average achieve lower volatility than the 
benchmark. The results have shown that the best performing property fund over the period was 
the risk parity portfolio of risk weighted property stocks which achieved significantly higher 
average returns than the benchmark whilst having lower volatility and beta. Making use of a 
strategy which minimises risk by weighting the proportion of shares based on their risk 
contributions has been shown to be highly effective in the property sector. Thus the results 
suggest that investors wanting to get exposure to the listed property market in South Africa are 
better off making use of a risk parity portfolio of property stocks, as it is has been shown to 
achieve larger returns with less volatility than the property benchmark and other funds. This 
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study was the first of its kind looking specifically at South African property unit trusts to 






























6. Limitations and Recommendations for Future Studies 
This study was unable to avoid the effects of survivorship bias, as data on funds which have 
since closed down was not available. This means that there is a bias present in the data making 
it more likely that the funds in the sample show outperformance simply because they are the 
more successful funds over the period. This has been considered when analysing the results. 
However, ultimately this issue has not impacted the overall results substantially, as the results 
showed that only a small number of funds achieved noteworthy outperformance and the 
majority of funds failed to outperform, even underperforming the benchmark. It would 
however have been useful to include funds which had closed in order to assess their 
performance compared to the benchmark. 
A further limitation is that this paper excluded funds that opened after 2015. Although this was 
done in order to have at least 4 years of performance data per fund, it is still possible to analyse 
these newer funds and determine their performance since inception. This is especially useful 
since many of the newer funds are passive ETF funds which would have been useful to include 
in this study, as there were only 5 passive funds present in this study. Furthermore, many of 
the newer passive funds make use of different benchmarks than the SAPY and therefore their 
performance is of interest. Further research can look at more recent time periods and include 
newer passive funds in the analysis.  
A further area of research related to this this study is to more closely analyse the performance 
of these funds to determine the reasons for abnormal performance across funds. This study did 
not look at asset holdings data of funds which may be useful to determine potential reasons for 
abnormal performance of funds. There is scope to look deeper into each fund's asset allocations 
and holdings of shares to determine why some funds out/underperform. This was not included 
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